Newbs Lose, Experts Win: Video Games in the Supreme Court by Campbell, Angela J.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2017 
Newbs Lose, Experts Win: Video Games in the Supreme Court 
Angela J. Campbell 
Georgetown University Law Center, campbeaj@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1988 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009812 
 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
Angela J. Campbell*
Newbs Lose, Experts Win:
Video Games in the Supreme Court
Table of Contents
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
II. The Advantage of a Supreme Court Expert . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
A. California’s Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
B. Entertainment Merchant Association’s (EMA)
Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
III. Background on the Video Game Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
A. Cases Prior to Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Ass’n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
B. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n . . . . . . . . . . 978
1. Before the District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980
2. Before the Ninth Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980
3. Supreme Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984
IV. Comparison of Expert and Non-Expert Representation
in Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985
A. Merits Briefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985
1. Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986
a. California’s Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987
b. EMA’s Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
c. A More Effective Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . 989
2. Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991
a. Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991
b. California’s Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
c. EMA’s Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993
3. California’s Risky Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995
B. Alternative Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
1. Facial Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
2. Intermediate Scrutiny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
3. Whose First Amendment Rights? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
© Copyright held by the NEBRAKSA LAW REVIEW
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.  Professor Campbell thanks her
research assistants Carolina Alonso, Ashley Nash, Margo Varona, Luke McFar-
land, and Matthew Scutari for their many helpful contributions to this Article.
She also thanks those who attended and provided comments on the draft
presented at a Georgetown Faculty Workshop.
965
966 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:965
4. Strict Scrutiny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
C. Amicus Briefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
1. Briefs Supporting California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
2. Briefs Supporting EMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005
3. Influence of the Amicus Briefs on the Justices . . 1008
D. Oral Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009
1. Role of Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010
2. Quantitative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
3. Qualitative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012
a. Morazzini’s Oral Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013
b. Smith’s Oral Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016
V. Did Advocacy Matter? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018
VI. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
I. INTRODUCTION
Newb: A term used to describe an inexperienced gamer/person/etc. Unlike a
noob, a newb is someone who actually wants to get better.1
In the five years since the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a
California statute prohibiting the sale of ultra-violent video games to
minors in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,2 not a single ju-
risdiction has passed a law regulating the sale of violent video games
to minors.  The absence of legislation is striking in light of several sub-
sequent and highly publicized shootings linked to violent video games.
For example, after Adam Lanza shot and killed twenty elementary
school students in Newtown, Connecticut, in December 2012, it was
widely reported that Lanza spent most of his day in the basement
playing violent video games such as Call of Duty.3
1. Newb, URBANDICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=new
b [https://perma.unl.edu/23P7-NJHX].
2. 564 U.S. 786 (2011).  The name of this case below was Video Software Dealers
Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger.  In 2006, the Video Software Dealers Association
(VSDA) merged with the Interactive Entertainment Merchants Association
(IEMA) to create the Entertainment Merchants Association (EMA).  After Jerry
Brown became Governor of California in 2011, his name was substituted for
Schwarzenegger.  The Entertainment Software Association (ESA) was also party
to this case along with VSDA and EMA.  For simplicity, this Article will use EMA
to refer to them collectively.
3. N.R. Kleinfield, Ray Rivera & Serge F. Kovaleski, Newtown Killer’s Obsession, in
Chilling Detail, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/
nyregion/search-warrants-reveal-items-seized-at-adam-lanzas-home.html. See
also The Contested Field of Violent Video Games: Research Roundup, JOURNAL-
IST’S RESOURCE (Jan. 31, 2015), http://journalistsresource.org/studies/govern-
ment/criminal-justice/value-violent-video-games-research-roundup [https://
perma.unl.edu/FVT8-XN7M] (reporting that “the man who killed 77 people in
Norway in 2011 testified that he prepared for the assault by playing the first-
person shooter video game Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2”).
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After the Newtown shootings, some officials called for new legisla-
tion.4  New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, for example, sought legis-
lation to limit the sale of violent video games to minors.5  West
Virginia Senator John Rockefeller introduced a bill to fund the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences to study the impact of violent video games
and violent video programming on children.6  Utah Representative
Jim Matheson introduced a bill that would have prohibited the sale or
rental of video games to minors with an Entertainment Software Rat-
ings Board (ESRB) rating of “adults only” or “mature.”7  But none of
these measures passed.
Moreover, policymakers seem to have lost interest in even trying to
pass legislation.  After the shootings at the Washington Navy Yard in
September 2013, for example, “cable news hosts quickly homed in on
the shooter’s obsession with playing military-style online games, re-
peatedly asking whether it was a factor in the mass shootings.”8  This
time, however, “that line of questioning was all but missing . . . on
Capitol Hill, where hardly a word was uttered about video game
violence.”9
It is not surprising states have given up trying to prevent the sale
of violent video games to minors.  The Brown decision found that
4. See, e.g., Lou Kesten, Shooting Renews Argument Over Video-Game Violence, AS-
SOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 19, 2012), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/shooting-renews-
argument-over-video-game-violence-162448882—finance.html [https://perma.
unl.edu/58P3-XQPK].
5. Jenna Portnoy, Christie Issues Plan to Strengthen N.J. Gun Laws and Address
Violence, STAR-LEDGER (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/
04/christie_gun_violence.html [https://perma.unl.edu/28M4-6EQY].
6. Violent Content Research Act of 2013, S. 134, 113th Cong. (2013); Katy Bachman,
Rockefeller Plans to Reintroduce Bill to Study Violent Video Games, ADWEEK
(Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.adweek.com/tv-video/rockefeller-plans-reintroduce-
bill-study-violent-video-games-146523/ [https://perma.unl.edu/46J3-42D2].
7. Video Games Ratings Enforcement Act, H.R. 287, 113th Cong. (2013).  The ESRB
was created in 1994 by the Entertainment Software Association after Senators
Lieberman and Kohl held a hearing making clear they would pursue government
regulation unless the industry started to self-regulate.  William K. Ford, The Law
and Science of Video Game Violence: What was Lost in Translation?, 31 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 297, 310-11 (2013).  The ESRB assigns one of six age-based
ratings to video games. About ESRB, ENTM’T. SOFTWARE RATINGS BD., http://
www.esrb.org/about/ [https://perma.unl.edu/UAN7-W8XE].  They are: EC (Early
Childhood); E (Everyone); E10+ (Everyone 10 and older); T (Teen); M (Mature
17+); and AO (Adults Only 18+).  The ESRB may also include “content
descriptors” such as “strong language” and “intense violence.” ESRB Ratings,
ENTM’T SOFTWARE RATINGS BD., http://www.esrb.org/ratings/ [https://perma.unl.
edu/F4AC-34AM].
8. Anna Palmer, Video Game Violence Not in Play, POLITICO (Sept. 23, 2013), http://
www.politico.com/story/2013/09/congress-video-game-violence-navy-yard-097131
[https://perma.unl.edu/3V8X-TM6F].
9. Id.  This author attributes the change as a “clear sign of the investment video
game companies have made in making friends in Washington.”
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“[b]ecause the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected
speech, it is invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes
strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a compelling govern-
ment interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”10  It is
extremely difficult to meet the test for strict scrutiny.
In Brown, the majority concluded that California failed to meet the
test because:
[t]he State’s evidence is not compelling.  California relies primarily on the re-
search of Dr. Craig Anderson and a few other research psychologists whose
studies purport to show a connection between exposure to violent video games
and harmful effects on children.  These studies have been rejected by every
court to consider them, and with good reason: They do not prove that violent
video games cause minors to act aggressively (which would at least be a begin-
ning).  Instead, “[n]early all of the research is based on correlation, not evi-
dence of causation, and most of the studies suffer from significant, admitted
flaws in methodology.”11
Much of the scholarly commentary before and after the Brown de-
cision focused on whether social science research shows violent video
games “cause” violence or other harmful effects in the real world.  Dr.
Craig Anderson, distinguished professor of psychology at Iowa State
University, has published multiple studies finding that exposure to
violent video games makes youths more aggressive and less caring.12
His work has been relied on by states and localities in passing legisla-
tion regulating minors’ access to violent video games.13  But he is not
alone; many other researchers have also found negative consequences
from playing violent video games.14
10. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (citing R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992)).
11. Id. at 800 (citing Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950,
964 (9th Cir. 2009)).
12. Anderson is coauthor of the book VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES EFFECTS ON CHILDREN
AND ADOLESCENTS (2007).  His website lists dozens of articles on video game vio-
lence, as well as articles on media violence more generally. Works “In Press” &
Publications Since 1995, CRAIG A. ANDERSON, https://public.psych.iastate.edu/
caa/recpub.html [https://perma.unl.edu/5EZM-VTHZ].
13. See Vita: Craig A. Anderson, IOWA ST. UNIV. (Aug. 2011), https://public.psych.ia
state.edu/caa/Vita.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/RM4B-RHYY].
14. E.g., Brad J. Bushman et al., There Is Broad Consensus: Media Researchers Agree
That Violent Media Increase Aggression in Children, and Pediatricians and Par-
ents Concur, 4 PSYCHOL. POPULAR MEDIA CULTURE 200 (2014); Youssef Hasan et
al., The More You Play, The More Aggressive You Become: A Long-Term Experi-
mental Study of Cumulative Violent Video Game Effects on Hostile Expectations
and Aggressive Behavior, 49 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 224 (2013); Maxine
M. Denniston et al., Associations Between Electronic Media Use and Involvement
in Violence, Alcohol and Drug Use Among United States High School Students, 12
WEST. J. EMERG. MED. 310 (2011).
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Dr. Christopher Ferguson is probably the most vocal and prolific
critic of the research on video game violence.15  He has criticized re-
searchers for making claims not supported by the data, failing to ad-
dress or even mention research that reaches a different conclusion,
and overstating causality.16  After the Brown decision, he called on
the psychological community to view the decision as “an opportunity
to learn from the mistakes made and to begin the process of scientific
self-correction.”17  Anderson and others have responded to these criti-
cisms.18  Nonetheless, the debate over the effects of video game vio-
lence continues.19
Other scholarship has examined whether courts correctly under-
stand the scientific evidence on video game violence.  William K. Ford,
for example, concluded that “[o]n the whole, the courts did a mediocre
job of assessing the scientific evidence.”20  One problem was simply
the large volume of research.  Ford found that no court analyzed the
entire literature on video game violence.21  Also, judges and lawyers
lacked the training and background knowledge to understand scien-
15. Ferguson holds a Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the University of Central Flor-
ida. Chris Ferguson’s Publications, CHRIS FERGUSON, http://www.christopherjfer
guson.com/pubs.html [https://perma.unl.edu/39WS-7NLT].  He has taught at
Texas A&M International University, and is currently an Associate Professor and
Chair of Psychology at Stetson University. Id.  His list of publications shows he
has written or co-authored more than forty articles on the topic of video game
violence since 2007. Id.
16. E.g., Christopher J. Ferguson, Violent Video Games and the Supreme Court, 68
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 57 (2013).
17. Id. at 71.
18. E.g., Brad J. Bushman & Craig A. Anderson, Understanding Causality in the
Effects of Media Violence, 59 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1 (2015).
19. See, e.g., Malte Elson & Christopher J. Ferguson, Does Doing Media Violence Re-
search Make One Aggressive?, EUR. PSYCHOLOGIST (2013), www.christopherjfer
guson.com/EP%20Review%20Part%202.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/44CV-
GHBD].  In response to the controversy, the American Psychological Association
(APA) established a task force in 2013 to review its 2005 Resolution on Violence
in Video Games and Interactive Media. Resolution on Violence in Video Games
and Interactive Media, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/about/poli
cy/interactive-media.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/4MFT-LD4X].  The task force
concluded that “[v]iolent video game play is linked to increased aggression in
players but insufficient evidence exists about whether the link extends to crimi-
nal violence or delinquency.”  Press Release, Am. Psychological Ass’n, APA Re-
view Confirms Link Between Playing Violent Video Games and Aggression (Aug.
13, 2015), www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2015/08/violent-video-games.aspx.
20. Ford, supra note 7, at 299; see also Clay Calvert et al., Social Science, Media
Effects & the Supreme Court: Is Communications Research Relevant After Brown
v. Entertainment Merchants Association? 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 293 (2012) (ex-
amining the effect the Brown decision will have on the use of social science evi-
dence in First Amendment based cases).
21. Ford, supra note 7, at 325–26.
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tific literature.22  He suggests that judges are “insufficiently exposed
to scientific writings that are forthcoming about their weaknesses or
limitations,” which may explain why the courts “treated standard
scholarly statements about the limitations of their work as something
closer to admissions of failure.”23  Ford cites the Ninth Circuit deci-
sion as an example of a court rejecting research due to readily admit-
ted flaws.24  Yet, the Brown majority opinion accepted that reasoning
uncritically.25  Others, however, have defended the majority’s dismis-
sal of the scientific literature as properly recognizing “that correla-
tional data are insufficient to overcome basic First Amendment
principles.”26
This Article focuses on the role of the lawyers using the framework
described by Professor Richard J. Lazarus in his 2008 article, Advo-
cacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the
Court by Transforming the Bar.27  Lazarus argues the modern Su-
preme Court bar has come to be dominated by a small number of Su-
preme Court specialists.  Because of their experience and superior
knowledge of the Justices and Supreme Court practice, Supreme
Court specialists are more likely to obtain outcomes desired by their
clients, which are typically large corporations or industry trade as-
sociations.28  Consistent with Lazarus’s finding, this Article shows the
video game industry’s representation by a Supreme Court specialist in
Brown gave it advantages over California that likely affected the out-
come of the case.
Part II analyzes whether the counsel in Brown fit within Lazarus’s
definition of a Supreme Court specialist.  Part III provides background
on the Brown case and the cases that came before it.  Part IV com-
pares the expert and non-expert representation in Brown by examin-
ing the parties’ briefs, the amicus briefs, and the oral argument.
Finally, Part V explores whether the case might have come out differ-
ently if both sides had been represented by Supreme Court specialists.
22. Id. at 331–32.  In Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Hatch, for example, the district court
judge appeared not to know what a meta-analysis was or that the use of meta-
analyses is widely accepted. Id. at 327.
23. Id. at 328–29.
24. Id. at 329.
25. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 800 (2011).
26. Robert Corn-Revere, Moral Panics, the First Amendment, and the Limits of Social
Science, 28 COMM. L. 4 (2011).
27. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487 (2008).
28. Id. at 1490–91.  Others have drawn similar conclusions. See, e.g., Jeffrey L.
Fisher, A Clinic’s Place in the Supreme Court Bar, 65 STAN. L. REV. 137, 151–61
(2013); Kedar S. Bhatia, Top Supreme Court Advocates of the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 2 J. L. 561 (2012); Joseph W. Swanson, Experience Matters: The Rise of a
Supreme Court Bar and its Effect on Certiorari, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 175
(2007).
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It concludes that with expert representation, California could have
captured the five votes necessary to win, or at least obtained a nar-
rower decision that would have allowed the legislature to try again to
craft a law that could survive a constitutional challenge.
II. THE ADVANTAGE OF A SUPREME COURT EXPERT
Since the publication of Lazarus’s article, Supreme Court practice
has become even more concentrated in a small number of lawyers and
law firms.  A Reuters Special Report, The Echo Chamber, published in
December 2014, documents this trend.29  This study examined Peti-
tions for Writs of Certiorari filed by private attorneys from 2004
through 2012.  It found that “66 of the 17,000 lawyers who petitioned
the Supreme Court succeeded at getting their clients’ appeals heard at
a remarkable rate.  Their appeals were at least six times more likely
to be accepted by the Court than were all others filed by private law-
yers during that period.”30  Of the sixty-six lawyers, “51 worked for
law firms that primarily represented corporate interests.”31  Almost
half (thirty-one out of sixty-six) attended law school at Harvard or
Yale.32
The Reuters study also examined all oral arguments by private at-
torneys during the last ten years.  It identified only thirty-four law-
yers who argued at least five cases.  Within this group, eight lawyers
argued fifteen or more cases.33  Or put differently, eight lawyers ac-
counted for almost twenty percent of all Supreme Court oral argu-
ments by attorneys in private practice.34  All but one of the eight had
worked in the U.S. Solicitor General’s office, or clerked for a Justice, or
both.35  Reuters further reports that the Justices “acknowledge the
growing specialization of the Supreme Court bar, and they largely
29. The Echo Chamber consists of a series of articles by various authors.  The entire
series is available at The Echo Chamber, REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/inves
tigates/special-report/scotus/#interactive-lawyers [https://perma.unl.edu/MRS7-
SM56].
30. Joan Biskupic et al., At America’s Court of Last Resort, a Handful of Lawyers
Now Dominates the Docket, in The Echo Chamber, supra note 29.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Janet Roberts, Analyzing the Impact of the Supreme Court Bar, in The Echo
Chamber, supra note 29.  The decade before, 30 attorneys accounted for 20% of
arguments. Id.
34. Janet Roberts et al., In an Ever-Clubbier Specialty Bar, 8 Men Have Become Su-
preme Court Confidants, in The Echo Chamber, supra note 29.  Overall, the per-
centage of cases featuring an oral advocate who clerked for a sitting justice
increased from less than 20% in 1995 to almost 60% in 2010. Id. (graph “Familiar
Faces”).
35. Id.
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welcome it,” because the “elite lawyers help them understand and sift
through complex legal issues.”36
Lazarus defines a Supreme Court expert as an attorney who has
presented at least five prior oral arguments.  Because Supreme Court
arguments are rare, attorneys with five or more oral arguments likely
filed far more briefs in the Supreme Court.37  He also counts as a Su-
preme Court expert an attorney presenting oral argument for the first
time if he or she is affiliated with a law firm or other comparable or-
ganization that has, in the aggregate, argued before the Court at least
ten times, because that attorney “inevitably” will receive expert advice
from professional colleagues.38  Included within this category are the
Office of the U.S. Solicitor General, law firms with a significant Su-
preme Court practice—such as Mayer Brown, Wilmer Hale, or Sidley
Austin—and public-interest organizations with substantial Supreme
Court experience.
A. California’s Counsel
Zachery P. Morazzini, supervising deputy attorney general, was
the lead attorney representing California.  Morazzini received his law
degree from the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law in
1999, and began working for the California Department of Justice in
2001.39  He argued the Brown case in the Ninth Circuit, but had never
argued before the U.S. Supreme Court.40  In video game parlance, he
was a “newbie” or “newb.”  Because he had no prior experience before
the U.S. Supreme Court, he does not qualify as a Supreme Court ex-
pert under Lazarus’s first prong.
The second prong—whether he was affiliated with an organization
comparable to a law firm with ten Supreme Court arguments—is
more difficult to assess.  Lazarus notes that some states have estab-
lished the position of a state solicitor general modeled after the U.S.
Solicitor General.41  California is one of those states.42  California’s
opening brief lists Deputy Solicitor General Gordon Burns, and its re-
ply brief lists Solicitor General Manuel M. Medeiros, suggesting some
36. Id.
37. Lazarus, supra note 27, at 1502.
38. Id.
39. Zachary Morazzini, Director—Office of Administrative Hearings, CAL. DEP’T OF
GEN. SERVS., http://www.dgs.ca.gov/dgs/About/ExecRoster/ZackeryMorazzini.
aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/36MJ-RWB3].
40. This information was deduced after a Westlaw search for counsel of record before
the Supreme Court did not return any results for his name.
41. Lazarus, supra note 27, at 1501.
42. Peter Page, State Solicitor General Appointments Open Doors for Appellate Prac-
titioners, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 18, 2008), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=12
02423731494/State-solicitor-general-appointments-open-doors-for-appellate-prac
titioners [https://perma.unl.edu/Q8GG-KQ4F].
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involvement by the state solicitor general’s office.  Morazzini, how-
ever, is identified on the briefs as supervising deputy attorney gen-
eral, so he presumably was not in the state solicitor general’s office.
To qualify under the second prong, Morazzini would have had to be
in the state solicitor general’s office or to have received substantial
guidance from experienced Supreme Court advocates.43  Because Cali-
fornia’s attorney general’s office was facing budget cuts and staff lay-
offs during the time it was defending the video game law,44 it is
reasonable to conclude Morazzini lacked sufficient time and assis-
tance to qualify as a Supreme Court expert.
B. Entertainment Merchant Association’s (EMA) Counsel
By contrast, there is no question the lead counsel for the video
game industry, Paul M. Smith, a partner at the Washington, D.C., law
firm Jenner & Block, is a Supreme Court expert.  Indeed, Lazarus
even identifies Smith by name as one of the best Supreme Court
advocates.45
Smith fits the mold of a Supreme Court specialist.  He graduated
from Yale Law School in 1979.46  After law school, he clerked for
Judge Oakes on the Second Circuit and then for Justice Powell on the
Supreme Court.47  At the time of the Brown argument, Smith already
had fourteen oral arguments in the Supreme Court.48  Before leaving
private practice to teach at Georgetown, Smith was a partner at the
Washington, D.C., law firm Jenner & Block, where he headed the
43. Lazarus, supra note 27, at 1502, n.73 (explaining why an attorney working for a
firm in a different location from the one with an aggregate of ten arguments
would not qualify and why a faculty member would not qualify even if other
faculty had done ten arguments).
44. Jerry Brown, who had been elected attorney general in 2006, made deep cuts in
the budget of the attorney general’s office.  His website boasted that “[s]ince tak-
ing office in 2006, Brown has returned over $231 million to the State treasury.
Brown achieved these budget savings by freezing new hiring, eliminating nearly
800 positions, folding ten divisions into four, and strengthening controls on
purchases.  Brown decreased in-state travel by 47%, out-of-state travel by 72%,
and overtime by 29%.” Jerry Brown Accomplishments as Attorney General,
UCLA DIG. LIBRARY (Aug. 12, 2012), http://digital.library.ucla.edu/websites/
2010_995_002/jerry-brown-accomplishments-attorney-general/index.htm [https://
perma.unl.edu/84BE-RGJA].
45. Lazarus, supra note 27, at 1557–58. See also Kedar S. Bhatia, Top Supreme
Court Advocates of the Twenty-First Century, 2 J.L. 561, 571 (2012) (including
Smith in listing of all advocates who argued before the Supreme Court at least
five times from 2000 to 2010).
46. Paul M. Smith, THE FEDERALIST SOC’Y, http://www.fed-soc.org/experts/detail/
paul-m-smith [https://perma.unl.edu/7PFX-3Z6S].
47. Id.
48. Appellate and Supreme Court Practice, JENNER & BLOCK, https://jenner.com/prac
tices/100 [https://perma.unl.edu/L9YZ-527L].
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firm’s appellate and Supreme Court practice.49  The firm website de-
scribed Smith as having had “a Supreme Court practice for nearly
three decades.  He has argued sixteen Supreme Court cases, including
the Brown video game case in 2011, several important voting rights
cases, and Lawrence v. Texas.”50  Thus, Smith personally qualifies as
a Supreme Court expert.51
Smith also had substantial experience challenging the constitu-
tionality of laws regulating violent video games.  Smith’s firm, Jenner
& Block, represented the video game industry in all but one challenge
to laws restricting minors’ access to violent video games.52  Smith’s
name was listed on all the briefs filed by Jenner & Block.  Smith ar-
gued the case below in the Ninth Circuit.53  He  also successfully ar-
gued a case in the Seventh Circuit challenging a similar statute
passed by Illinois.54
The video game industry could afford to pay for such high quality
representation.55  In 2010, the global video game industry was “more
than twice the size of the recorded-music industry, nearly a quarter
more than the magazine business and about three-fifths the size of the
film industry, counting DVD sales as well as box-office receipts.”56
Litigating the Brown case in the Supreme Court alone cost the video
game industry more than a million dollars in fees and expenses.57
Smith alone billed $253,550, at the rate of $765 per hour.58  Eight
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Smith would also qualify as an expert under Lazarus’s second prong because Jen-
ner & Block attorneys have argued more than 100 cases before the Supreme
Court. See id.
52. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 (2000).
While Smith did not represent the plaintiff in Kendrick, he did file an amicus
brief on behalf of the Interactive Digital Software Association.
53. Video Software Dealer’s Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 952 (9th Cir.
2009).
54. Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2006).
55. The video game industry is large and growing.  “From 2005 through 2009, the
computer and video game industry achieved real annual growth of 10.6% per
year,” compared to 1.4% for the entire US economy.  Stephen E. Siwek, Video
Games in the 21st Century: The 2010 Report, ENTM’T SOFTWARE ASS’N 1, 3 (2010)
[hereinafter Siwek Report].
56. Tim Cross, All the World’s a Game, ECONOMIST (Dec. 10, 2011), http://
www.economist.com/node/21541164 [https://perma.unl.edu/2J4Q-S977].
57. Respondents’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses, Brown v. Entm’t Merchs.
Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (No. 08-1448).  This motion asked for $1,144,602.64,
and stated they planned to seek additional reimbursements for time spent in
2011. Id.  Prior to the Supreme Court litigation, the District Court for the South-
ern District of California had ordered the State to pay $324,840 to the industry
counsel.  Lyle Denniston, A Rare Request for Supreme Court Fees, SCOTUS
BLOG, (July 25, 2011), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/07/a-rare-request-for-fees/
[https://perma.unl.edu/22RJ-UD67].
58. Respondents’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses, supra note 57.
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other attorneys at Jenner & Block billed time ranging from $314 to
$540 per hour.59
In sum, the Brown case fits comfortably within the model that con-
cerned Lazarus.  The well-heeled corporate side was represented by
expert Supreme Court counsel, while the other side, a cash-strapped
state, was represented by an attorney with no Supreme Court
experience.
III. BACKGROUND ON THE VIDEO GAME CASES
Prior to the Brown decision, eight states or localities had passed
laws regulating minors’ access to video games.  The City of Indianapo-
lis passed the first law in 2000 in reaction to the shootings at Colum-
bine High School by young men who spent a lot of time playing violent
video games.60  The video game industry brought a facial challenge
against this ordinance, as well as every subsequent law.  In each case,
the industry obtained a preliminary injunction, so none of the laws
ever took effect.  While some were appealed, Brown was the only one
taken up by the Supreme Court.
A. Cases Prior to Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n
The Indianapolis ordinance at issue in American Amusement Ma-
chine Ass’n v. Kendrick forbade arcades from allowing minors unac-
companied by a parent to play games containing graphic violence
considered “harmful to minors.”61  The district court viewed the case
as presenting three main issues.
First, it considered whether video games were entitled to protec-
tion under the First Amendment at all.62  The City argued that video
games were “closely analogous to mechanical pinball machines or
shooting galleries at a local fair,” and were not protected by the First
Amendment.63  The court disagreed, noting that “at least some con-
temporary video games include protected forms of expression.”64
Second, the court considered the appropriate standard of review.
The industry argued the ordinance was a content-based restriction on
59. Id.  The ESA’s website boasted that the software industry had recovered
$3,223,916 in legal fees from state and local taxpayers. Essential Facts about
Video Games and Court Rulings, ENTM’T SOFTWARE ASS’N, http://www.theesa
.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ESA_EF_VidGamesCourtRulings.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/D25S-GBJH].
60. Gregory Kenyota, Thinking of the Children: The Failure of Violent Video Game
Laws, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 785, 792 (2008).
61. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 (2000).
62. Id. at 950.
63. Id. at 952.
64. Id. at 954.
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speech that should be reviewed under “strict scrutiny.”65  The City
countered that the correct standard of review was set forth in the 1968
case, Ginsberg v. New York.66
In Ginsberg, the Supreme Court upheld a facial challenge to a New
York criminal statute prohibiting the sale of “girlie” magazines to mi-
nors.  The New York statute used a modification of the three-part defi-
nition of obscenity set forth in Roth v. United States.67  It defined the
prohibited magazines as depicting nudity that “(i) predominantly ap-
peals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, (ii) is
patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a
whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) is
utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.”68  Since the
magazines at issue were not obscene with respect to adults, they were
protected under the First Amendment.  Nonetheless, the Court upheld
the statute.  Although the Court did not specify the applicable stan-
dard of review, it essentially applied a form of rational-basis review.69
This standard has come to be known as the “harmful to minors” or
“variable obscenity” test.
The district court in Kendrick agreed that the Ginsberg standard
applied to the Indianapolis ordinance.70  Like the statute in Ginsberg,
the ordinance was intended to serve the state interests in the well-
being of youth and in parents’ authority to direct their children’s up-
bringing.71  It noted the “Supreme Court has consistently recognized
such interests as substantial, and it has done so without requiring so-
cial science research definitively proving the danger of harm to chil-
dren.”72  Also like the New York law, the ordinance did not limit
adults’ access to the content, nor did it prevent parents who so desired
from allowing their children to be exposed to the regulated material.73
Applying the Ginsberg test, the district court upheld the statute.  It
concluded the ordinance was carefully tailored to address potential
65. Id. at 955.
66. Id.
67. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
68. 390 U.S. 629, 633 (1968) (emphasis added).
69. The Court declared that “if it was rational for the legislature to find that the
minors’ exposure to such material might be harmful,” the statute was constitu-
tional. Id. at 639 (emphasis added).  It then found that the “legislature could
properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have this
primary responsibility for children’s well-being are entitled to the support of laws
designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.”  Id.  Moreover, it “was not irra-
tional for the legislature to find that exposure to material condemned by the stat-
ute is harmful to minors,” and the State “has an independent interest in the well-
being of its youth.” Id. at 640–41.
70. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 959.
71. Id. at 976.
72. Id. at 958.
73. Id. at 958–59.
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harm to children without infringing upon other First Amendment in-
terests because it did not significantly limit adults from using the
games, did not engage in viewpoint discrimination, did not limit the
expression of ideas, and only authorized civil enforcement.74
The industry appealed and the Seventh Circuit reversed.75  Judge
Posner’s decision for the Seventh Circuit rejected the analogy to
Ginsberg:
These games with their cartoon characters and stylized mayhem are continu-
ous with an age-old children’s literature on violent themes.  The exposure of
children to the “girlie” magazines involved in the Ginsberg case was not.  It
seemed obvious to the Supreme Court that these magazines were an adult
invasion of children’s culture and parental prerogatives.  No such argument is
available here.76
The Seventh Circuit also went on to reject the City’s reliance on
social science.  Characterizing the social science as consisting “prima-
rily of the pair of psychological studies . . . reported in an article by
Craig A. Anderson & Karen E. Dill,”77 it found
no indication that the games used in the studies are similar to those in the
record of this case or to other games likely to be marketed in game arcades in
Indianapolis.  The studies do not find that video games have ever caused any-
one to commit a violent act, as opposed to feeling aggressive . . . [a]nd they do
not suggest that it is the interactive character of the games, as opposed to the
violence of the images in them, that is the cause of the aggressive feelings.78
The different views of the district court and the Seventh Circuit on
the three issues in Kendrick were repeated again and again, with sub-
tle variations as other states and localities tried different approaches
to restrict youth access to violent video games.79  Yet, every one of
74. Id. at 946.
75. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001).
76. Id. at 578.
77. Id. (citing Craig A. Anderson & Karen E. Dill, Personality Processes and Individ-
ual Differences—Video Games and Aggressive Thoughts, Feelings, and Behavior
in the Laboratory and in Life, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 772 (2000)).
78. Id. at 578–79.
79. The next locality to pass a law restricting minors’ access to violent video games
was St. Louis County, Missouri.  The district court upheld that law on the
grounds that video games were not protected expression, and even if they were,
the ordinance was narrowly tailored to legitimate government objectives and was
not unconstitutionally vague.  Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cty.,
200 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (E.D. Mo. 2002).  However, the Eighth Circuit overturned
this ruling, based in large part on the Seventh Circuit decision in Kendrick.  In-
teractive Dig. Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cty., 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003).
Washington State was next to pass a law limiting the access of minors to violent
video games.  The VSDA brought a challenge, and the district court reluctantly
concluded that “the Legislature’s belief that video games cause violence, particu-
larly violence against law enforcement officers, [was] not based on reasonable
inferences drawn from substantial evidence.”  Video Software Dealers Ass’n v.
Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1189 (W.D. Wash. 2004).  Next, a district court in
Michigan struck down a similar provision, finding that because the legislature
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these statutes was ultimately found unconstitutional by an appellate
court applying strict scrutiny.  And all of the courts cited Judge Pos-
ner’s conclusion that the social science research was insufficient to
meet strict scrutiny.80
B. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n
California Assembly Bill 1179 was drafted and introduced by Dem-
ocratic Assembly Member Leland Yee in 2005.81  Assemblyman Yee
received a PhD in Developmental Psychology and served on the San
Francisco Unified School District Board of Education before becoming
an Assemblyman.82  In introducing the bill, Yee explained the need for
it:
Since teens are wiring the circuits for self-control, responsibility and relation-
ships they will carry with them into adulthood, they are more impressionable
than we thought.  Active participation by youth in playing violent video games
has a greater impact than watching television.  Youth choose actions where
they are rewarded for causing violence to another character.  Repetition
greatly increases learning and also causes youth to identify with the aggressor
in the game.83
failed to consider alternatives such as the ESRB ratings, it was not narrowly
tailored.  Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 654 (E.D.
Mich. 2006).  Minnesota then passed a law imposing fines on minors for renting
or purchasing video games rated M for Mature or AO for Adults Only.  But the
video game industry obtained an injunction of this law as well.  Entm’t Software
Ass’n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Minn. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Entm’t
Software Ass’n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2008).  In 2005, Illinois passed
a law requiring violent video games to be labeled with a 2-inch high “18” and
imposing criminal penalties for selling or renting them to minors.  The district
court found that law unconstitutional because the State lacked evidence that vio-
lent video games incited violence or even caused feelings of aggression.  Entm’t
Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d,
469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006).  In Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n v. Henry, No. CIV-06-675-
C, 2007 WL 2743097 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2007), the district court found an
Oklahoma statute prescribing criminal penalties for disseminating material con-
sidered “harmful to minors” was unconstitutionally vague.  Finally, in Entertain-
ment Software Ass’n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823 (M.D. La. 2006), the district
court found that a Louisiana statute criminalizing distribution of video games
appealing to minors’ morbid interest in violence violated the First Amendment.
80. E.g., Interactive Dig. Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 957; Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d
646 at 651–54; Swanson, 519 F.3d at 772; Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at
1059–60, 1073–74; Henry, 2007 WL 2743097, at *6.
81. Matthew Yi, Sale of Violent Videos to Minors Under Fire Proposed Law Would
Impose $1,000 Fines, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 16, 2005), 2005 WLNR 2179310.
82. Brief of Amicus Curiae of California State Senator Leland Y. Yee et al., at 1,
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (No. 08-1448).  Yee had been
elected to the California Senate by the time the case reached the Supreme Court.
In 2015, he pled guilty to charges of racketeering and admitted accepting bribes.
Alexei Koseff, Former State Sen. Leland Yee Pleads Guilty to Corruption Charge,
SACRAMENTO BEE (July 1, 2005).
83. Violent Video Games: Sales to Minors: Hearing on AB 1179 Before the Cal. S.
Judiciary Comm., 2005–2006 Reg. Sess. 5 (Cal. 2005) [hereinafter Summary of
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Yee pointed to dozens of studies on violent video games.  He said
they showed five major effects: (1) increased physiological arousal; (2)
increased aggressive thoughts; (3) increased aggressive feelings; (4)
increased aggressive behaviors; and (5) decreased pro-social or helping
behaviors.84  He specifically cited the Policy Statement on Media Vio-
lence of the American Academy of Pediatrics that attributed a
13%–22% increase in adolescents’ violent behavior to playing violent
video games.85  Yee contended that “playing violent video games has
more effect on increased youth aggression than second-hand smoke
has on causing cancer, or lead exposure links to decreased IQ.”86
Yee’s efforts to get legislation were likely helped by the controversy
over the sexually explicit mini-game “Hot Coffee Mod” embedded in
the M-rated video game Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas.87  Senator
Yee “cited the Hot Coffee mod as he lambasted” the ESRB for not rat-
ing San Andreas as “adults only” in summer 2005.88
Yee and other California legislators were aware other states had
found similar legislation unconstitutional.  For example, the Senate
Judiciary Report on AB 1179 noted that the bills’ definition of “violent
video games”
directly follows the Ginsberg obscenity standard, and applies the terms of the
obscenity definition to video games where certain violent acts may be commit-
ted by a game character.  It is questionable whether this definition is appro-
priate under existing law.  Neither the IDSA or the Maleng decision is binding
in California, but those decisions and the precedent upon which they rely may
be persuasive to a California court.89
Despite concerns about constitutionality, an amended version of
the bill passed the California Assembly and the Senate on September
8, 2005.90  The video game industry, which had actively lobbied
against AB 1179, urged Governor Schwarzenegger to veto it.  For ex-
ample, the president of the Interactive Entertainment Merchants As-
sociation issued a statement saying in part:
We hope that Governor Schwarzenegger understands and appreciates the
lengths to which our members who conduct business in the State of California
AB 1179], http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_1151-1200/ab_1179_
cfa_20050908_123731_sen_comm.html [https://perma.unl.edu/GK55-7NZE].
84. Id. at 56.
85. Id. at 6.
86. Id.
87. Brendan Sinclair, Spot On: Leland Yee Talks Hot Coffee, GAMESPOT (July 15,
2005), http://www.gamespot.com/articles/spot-on-leland-yee-talks-hot-coffee/1100
-6129209/ [https://perma.unl.edu/54DJ-CEDU].  The minigame portrayed sexual
intercourse between the main character and his girlfriend after she asked him to
come into her home for “coffee,” a euphemism for sex.
88. Id.
89. Summary of AB 1179, supra note 83, at 8.
90. AB 1179, 2005 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/
asm/ab_1151-1200/ab_1179_bill_20051007_chaptered.html [https://perma.unl.
edu/7YQT-EKRT].
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have gone to fulfill their social obligations on a voluntary basis.  It was dis-
heartening to see the bill pass the house and senate, but we refuse to believe
that the Governor will allow this matter to become further politicized and di-
visive—leading only to a course which would inevitably cost the taxpayers
valuable resources, and an unceremonious fate that has been played out in the
court system.91
Nonetheless, Governor Schwarzenegger signed the bill on October 7,
2005.  The law was to take effect on January 1, 2006.
1. Before the District Court
Ten days after the bill was signed, however, the Video Software
Dealers Association (VSDA) sought a permanent injunction.  The
VSDA argued that video games are a form of protected expression,
even for minors, that the Act’s definition of “violent video game” was
void for vagueness, and that the labeling provisions violated the First
Amendment.92
The district court reviewed the video game cases from other juris-
dictions.93  It rejected the State’s claim that it should apply the Gins-
berg standard, and opted to follow the “prevailing view . . . that
limitations on a minor’s access to violent expression are subject to
strict scrutiny.”94  It concluded:
Whether, as the court in Kendrick indicated, the First Amendment may pre-
vent a state from having a legitimate compelling interest in restricting the
access of minors to violent video games, or, as the court in Blagojevich ruled,
Anderson’s research is insufficient to show such a compelling interest, the
plaintiffs have shown they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim
that the Act violates the First Amendment, or at least that serious questions
are raised.95
Thus, it granted a preliminary injunction.96
2. Before the Ninth Circuit
California appealed to the Ninth Circuit, again arguing for review
under the Ginsberg standard.  The Ninth Circuit found the appropri-
ate standard of review was a question of first impression in the Cir-
cuit.  Nonetheless, it rejected the State’s argument, observing that
Ginsberg was specifically rooted in obscenity jurisprudence, and that
91. Simon Carless, IEMA Responds to AB 1179 California Games Bill, GAMASUTRA
(Sept. 12, 2005), http://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/97448/IEMA_Responds_
To_AB1179_California_Games_Bill.php [https://perma.unl.edu/9FK9-D784].
92. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D. Cal.
2005) (granting preliminary injunction), aff’d, No. C-05-04188 RMW, 2007 WL
2261546 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007).
93. Id. at 1043–44.
94. Id. at 1045.
95. Id. at 1046.
96. Id. at 1048.  Subsequently, the Court granted summary judgment for the video
game industry plaintiffs.  Video Software Dealer’s Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, No.
C-05-04188 RMW, 2007 WL 2261546 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007).
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obscene speech, as opposed to violent speech, was not protected under
the First Amendment.97
California argued, in the alternative, that the Act met strict scru-
tiny.98  Its brief devoted more pages to that argument than to arguing
for the Ginsberg standard.99  First, California argued it had “a compel-
ling interest in assisting parents in their fight to limit children’s expo-
sure to material that can cause automatic aggressiveness, increased
aggressive thoughts and behavior, antisocial behavior, desensitization
to violence and poor school performance.”100  Next, California argued
that substantial evidence demonstrated that the Act promoted the
State’s compelling interest.  It described “the legislative record [as]
flush with peer-reviewed articles, studies, reports, and correspon-
dence from leading social scientists and medical associations analyz-
ing the impact of media violence, and specifically violent video games,
on minors and young adults.”101  It detailed the research conducted in
the years following Judge Posner’s 2001 determination in Kendrick
that the scientific evidence was insufficient to conclude a causal rela-
tionship existed.102  It also pointed out that professional medical as-
sociations, including the American Academy of Pediatrics and the
California Psychiatric Association, supported the legislation.103
Finally, California argued the law was narrowly tailored to serve
the State’s interests.104  It only applied to violent video games, not
other forms of media such as television, because “the player controls
the characters in first-person, causing them to shoot, stab, beat,
stomp, run over, or ignite the opponent.”105  The Act covered only a
narrow category of video games and did not restrict adult access to
those games.  And because California maintained the ESRB’s volun-
tary ratings system was ineffective, no less restrictive means would
achieve the State’s compelling interest.106
The industry brief argued the Act failed strict scrutiny.107  It noted
that even though the Act had two stated purposes—to prevent violent
and antisocial behavior and to prevent psychological or neurological
97. Video Software Dealer’s Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 957–61 (9th Cir.
2009).
98. Appellants’ Opening Brief, Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-
16620), 2008 WL 412514.
99. Compare id. at 24–48 (arguing the Act met strict scrutiny), with id. at 7–22 (argu-
ing for the Ginsberg standard of review).
100. Id. at 28.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 28–36.
103. Id. at 32–33.
104. Id. at 41–48.
105. Id. at 41.
106. Id. at 46–48.
107. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 26–48, Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (No. 07-
16620), 2008 WL 656626.
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harm to minors—the State defended it solely on the second ground.
But in any event, neither interest was compelling because “no sub-
stantial evidence demonstrates the harms are real.”108  In particular,
the industry argued, California failed to “establish any causal rela-
tionship between exposure to violent video games and any purported
harm,”109 or that video games are any more harmful than other vio-
lent media.110  Finally, the Act was not the least restrictive means
because the State failed to show that the ESRB ratings, either alone
or combined with parental controls, would not equally address the
State’s interests.111
The Ninth Circuit found that the Act did not pass strict scrutiny.
It reasoned that whether California’s interest in preventing harm to
minors was compelling depended on the effect of playing violent video
games had on minors.  The court rejected the studies cited by Califor-
nia, noting that “other courts have either rejected Dr. Anderson’s re-
search or found it insufficient to establish a causal link between
violence in video games and psychological harm.”112  Thus, it con-
cluded the State had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest.
Moreover, even if the State had demonstrated a compelling interest, it
failed to show the Act was narrowly tailored to serve that interest.113
Specifically, California failed to consider whether “an enhanced educa-
tion campaign about the ESRB rating system directed at retailers and
parents would help achieve government interests.”114
California filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Su-
preme Court in May 2009, arguing the Court should grant review for
three reasons.  First, the statute should be reviewed under Ginsberg’s
harmful to minors standard for the same reasons that standard ap-
plied to sexual materials sold to minors.115  Second, the issue was one
of national importance, as evidenced by the large number of state and
local regulations found unconstitutional by lower courts.  No lower
courts had been willing to extend Ginsberg, notwithstanding the fact
violent video games can be just as harmful to minors as sexual materi-
als.116  Finally, even assuming strict scrutiny applied, the Ninth Cir-
108. Id. at 27.
109. Id. at 33.
110. Id. at 37.
111. Id. at 47.
112. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 963.  The Court also dismissed a study by Dr. Gen-
tile as “suspect for similar reasons as Dr. Anderson’s work,” and found that a
different study by Dr. Funk failed to show causation as opposed to correlation.
Id. at 964.
113. Id. at 965 (citing U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)).
114. Id.
115. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786
(2011) (No. 08-1448).
116. Id. at 6.
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cuit’s decision conflicted with the Supreme Court’s decision in Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.117
Turner involved a constitutional challenge to the “must-carry” pro-
visions in the 1992 Cable Act, which required cable systems to re-
transmit local television stations.118  Finding the law to be content-
neutral, the majority applied intermediate scrutiny.119  Under this
level of scrutiny, the government must show the law serves a substan-
tial government interest.  Moreover, just because “the Government’s
asserted interests are important in the abstract does not mean, how-
ever, that the . . . rules will in fact advance those interests.”120  While
the Court accords substantial deference under intermediate scrutiny
to the predictive judgments of a legislature, it must assure that the
legislature “has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial
evidence.”121
The video game industry opposed certiorari, arguing the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decision was merely “a routine application of established First
Amendment principles to a content-based ban on protected expres-
sion.”122  Moreover, the Court had no reason to take the case because
there was neither a circuit split nor unresolved legal questions.123
The Supreme Court postponed deciding whether to hear the case
until after its decision in United States v. Stevens.124  In Stevens, the
Court upheld a facial challenge to a federal statute criminalizing de-
pictions of extreme animal cruelty for commercial purposes.125  The
language of that statute, like the California statute, was drawn from
the Court’s definition of obscenity in Miller v. California.126  The Gov-
ernment argued in Stevens that depictions of animal cruelty, as a
class, were like obscenity, and therefore categorically unprotected by
the First Amendment.  The Court, with only one dissent, rejected this
argument, concluding that “[m]aybe there are some categories of
speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been
specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law.  But if so,
there is no evidence that ‘depictions of animal cruelty’ is among
them.”127
117. Id. at 5 (citing Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)).
118. Turner, 512 U.S. at 626.
119. Id. at 661–62.
120. Id. at 664.
121. Id. at 666.  Thus, the Turner Court remanded for further proceedings on this
question. Id. at 668.
122. Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 1, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs.
Ass’n, 559 U.S. 1092 (2009) (No. 08-1448), rev’d sub nom. Brown, 564 U.S. 786
(2011).
123. Id. at 2–3.
124. 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
125. Id. at 481–82.
126. Id. at 479 (citing 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
127. Id. at 472.
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The Court granted review in Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment
Merchants Ass’n on April 26, 2010.128
3. Supreme Court
The Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit.  Writing for the
Court, Justice Scalia began with the premise that video games are a
form of expression entitled to the same First Amendment protection
as other media.  Thus, California’s law prohibiting the sale of exces-
sively violent video games to minors was presumptively invalid.129
The majority rejected California’s argument that the statute
should be evaluated under Ginsberg’s harmful to minors test.  Rather,
the case was controlled by the Court’s holding in Stevens, “that new
categories of unprotected speech may not be added to the list by a leg-
islature that concludes certain speech is too harmful to be toler-
ated.”130 Ginsberg was limited to obscenity, a category of speech that
had historically been unprotected.131  The California statute, how-
ever, dealt with violence, and children’s access to depictions of vio-
lence had not been historically restricted.132
Justice Scalia concluded that California was unable to demon-
strate the statute would pass strict scrutiny because “it acknowledges
that it cannot show a direct causal link between violent video games
and harm to minors.”133  He found the law “wildly underinclusive” be-
cause it singled out video game publishers as compared to distributors
of books, movies, and other forms of media portraying violence.134  At
the same time, he found the law was “seriously overinclusive because
it abridges the First Amendment rights of young people whose parents
. . . think violent video games are a harmless pastime.”135  Moreover,
parents did not need the law to restrict children’s access to violent
video games because the games were assigned age-based ratings by
ESRB.136
Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice
Roberts, agreeing with the outcome.  He thought the statute as
drafted did not provide sufficient notice to sellers as to what was pro-
hibited.137  However, he rejected the majority’s premise that video
game violence was no different than violence depicted in a book.138
128. Schwarzenegger, 559 U.S. 1092 (2010).
129. Brown, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011).
130. Id. at 791.
131. Id. at 793–94.
132. Id. at 794.
133. Id. at 799.
134. Id. at 802.
135. Id. at 805.
136. Id. at 803.
137. Id. at 805–07.
138. Id. at 806.
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Justice Thomas dissented because, in his view, freedom of speech
as understood by the Founders did not include the right to speak to a
minor without going through the parent.139  Justice Breyer dissented
for a different reason; he thought the statute was not unconstitution-
ally vague, and on its face, survived strict scrutiny.140
IV. COMPARISON OF EXPERT AND NON-EXPERT
REPRESENTATION IN BROWN
Lazarus argues an experienced Supreme Court advocate will likely
be more successful than the norm at the merits stage because he or
she “knows how to better pitch and, very often, how to pitch a case
differently than it has been pitched before.”141  He notes that what
“will fly in the lower courts may well be a total nonstarter in the Su-
preme Court,” and the best Supreme Court advocates “are always
ready to rethink and reformulate their legal position as necessary to
maximize the odds of winning before the Court.”142
As discussed in the next section, both sides made different argu-
ments in the Supreme Court than they did in the Ninth Circuit.  Cali-
fornia dropped its claim that the statute met strict scrutiny.  The
EMA attorneys, according to their request for attorneys’ fees, engaged
in “significant original research and briefing.”143
A. Merits Briefs
The initial briefs on the merits give the parties an opportunity to
frame the case.  Framing a case is important because as Lazarus
explains:
Supreme Court cases typically lend themselves to being pitched in multiple
ways.  The challenge the expert advocate faces is first, to conceptualize those
several possibilities and, second, to determine which framework is the one
that maximizes the chances of securing the minimum of five votes necessary
for a favorable outcome.  Doing so may require the development of entirely
new legal arguments.  It may require conceding away certain points and argu-
ments, even ones successful below, or at least de-emphasizing them from obvi-
ous viewing.144
For example, whether a case is viewed as an “environmental protec-
tion case” or a “plain meaning” case, can affect whether the party can
obtain five votes.145
Because the petitioner files the first brief, California had the op-
portunity to the frame the case in a manner most favorable to its side.
139. Id. at 822–23.
140. Id. at 846, 856.
141. Lazarus, supra note 27, at 1540.
142. Id.
143. Respondents’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses at 10, supra note 57.
144. Lazarus, supra note 27, at 1541 (citations omitted).
145. Id.
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But it squandered this opportunity.  Instead of providing the Court
with an overview of its position at the outset, California’s brief
plunged right into boilerplate sections such as “Opinions Below” and
“Jurisdiction.”
By contrast, the first paragraph of EMA’s brief set forth its view of
the case.
The California statute at bar is the latest in a long history of overreactions to
new expressive media.  In the past, comic books, true crime novels, movies,
rock music, and other new media have all been accused of harming our youth.
In each case, the perceived threat later proved unfounded.  Video games are
no different.  They are a widely popular form of expression enjoyed by millions
of people.  As such, under the First Amendment, they cannot be censored ab-
sent the most compelling justification, based on firm evidence of harm,
through a narrowly tailored statute where there is no less-restrictive
alternative.
The second paragraph succinctly told the Court why it should reject
California’s position.
California asks the Court to withdraw First Amendment protection from some
ill-defined subset of video games, at least as to minors, based on the same sort
of unsupported claims that animated past efforts to regulate new media.  This
Court should reject California’s dangerous proposal.  As the Court has long
recognized, it is not the role of government to decide which expressive materi-
als are “worthy” of constitutional protection.146
1. Statement of Facts
The selection and presentation of facts in the Statement of Facts
provides parties with another opportunity to frame the case in their
favor.  Supreme Court expert Eugene Gressman suggests that the
“[s]tatement should contain, normally in chronological sequence, a re-
cital of the facts of the case that are pertinent to the questions before
the Supreme Court. . . . Counsel should select the arrangement that
will best enable judges who, it should be assumed, know nothing of the
facts to understand the case.”147  While the Statement should not be
argumentative, “[t]his does not mean that the Statement cannot serve
a persuasive function.  A good lawyer will produce a Statement that is
fair and adequate, and at the same time, to the extent that the facts
permit, leaves the impression that right and justice demand a decision
in his or her favor.”148
Many judges and scholars have commented on the importance of
an effective Statement of Facts.149  Brief writers are advised that
“[w]hen writing the Statement of Facts, remember: the judge knows
146. Brief of Respondents at 1, Brown, 564 U.S. 786 (No. 08-1448).
147. EUGENE GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 712 (9th ed. 2007).
148. Id. at 713.
149. See generally Laurie A. Lewis, Winning the Game of Appellate Musical Shoes, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 983 (2011).
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nothing about this case.”150  A former appellate judge advises: “Let
the narrative of the facts tell a compelling story.  The facts are, almost
without exception, the heart of the case on appeal.  They should be set
forth as a story about a very real human situation.”151  Another judge
explains that the “the opportunity to persuade” begins with the State-
ment of Facts because appellate judges are familiar the law, but “the
facts often speak for themselves before the party has a chance to do so
in the argument component of the brief.”152  But, as another author
colorfully put it, the “notion that the facts, whether simple or compli-
cated, speak for themselves is sheer nonsense.  In reality there are as
many ways of telling the story of any case as there are fleas on a
dog.”153
a. California’s Statement of Facts
California’s Statement of Facts was four pages compared to EMA’s
almost eleven pages.  It did not tell a story.  Instead, it merely summa-
rized the California statute, the purpose of the legislation, and what
happened in the lower courts.  It provided little context to understand
why the California legislature enacted the law in the first place.
Nor did California’s Statement of Facts devote much effort to
describing the violent video games that would be subject to the law.
The only description of a violent video game in the Statement of Facts
was a block quote from the district court decision granting a prelimi-
nary injunction for the industry.
The game involves shooting both armed opponents, such as police officers, and
unarmed people, such as schoolgirls.  Girls attacked with a shovel will beg for
mercy; the player can be merciless and decapitate them.  People shot in the
leg will fall down and crawl; the player can then pour gasoline over them, set
them on fire, and urinate on them.  The player’s character makes sardonic
comments during all this; for example, urinating on someone elicits the com-
ment “Now the flowers will grow.”154
The brief did not name the game or discuss why it was inappropri-
ate for children.  California did submit a short videotape showing “sev-
eral vignettes from the games, Grand Theft Auto: Vice City, Postal 2,
150. Id. at 986 n.13 (quoting MYRON MOSKOVITZ, WINNING AN APPEAL (4th ed. 2007)).
151. Id. at 984 n.2 (citing Irving R. Kaufman, Appellate Advocacy in the Federal
Courts, 79 F.R.D. 165, 166 (1978)).
152. Id. at 986 n.11 (citing Clyde H. Hamilton, Effective Appellate Brief Writing, 50
S.C. L. REV. 581, 584–85 (1999)).
153. Id. at 984 n.4 (citing HAROLD R. MEDINA, THE ORAL ARGUMENT ON APPEAL, IN
ADVOCACY AND THE KING’S ENGLISH 537, 540 (George Rossman ed., 1960)).
154. Petitioners’ Brief at 3–4, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 559 U.S. 1092
(2010) (No. 08-1448) (citing Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 401
F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 2005)), rev’d sub nom. Brown, 564 U.S. 786
(2011).  Later, in the argument section of the brief, California described Postal II
more vividly in giving an example of a game that the industry’s system of self-
regulation recognized as inappropriate for minors. Id. at 45–46.
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and Duke Nukem 3D,” to demonstrate the myriad ways that charac-
ters could kill or injure adversaries.  But it did not describe the con-
text within which the violence occurred.155  Nor did the Statement of
Facts tell the Justices about the substantial amount of research link-
ing violent video games with harm to minors.  In sum, California’s
Statement of Facts failed to tell a story about why the California Leg-
islature found it necessary to pass a law limiting minors’ access to
extremely violent and inappropriate video games.
b. EMA’s Statement of Facts
In contrast, EMA’s brief told a story about how video games, even
violent ones, are no different than other forms of “artistic” expression
such as books and movies.  It began by describing the nature of video
games:
Video games are a modern form of artistic expression.  A video game is an
interactive software program that a player experiences on a screen, such as a
television or computer monitor.  Like films, video games incorporate dialogue,
music, visual images, plot, and character development.  Like the best of litera-
ture, they often involve classic themes that have captivated audiences for cen-
turies, such as good-versus-evil, triumph over adversity, struggle against
corrupt powers, and quest for adventure.156
Next, EMA provided statistics to show that video games are popu-
lar among all ages,157 and that the majority are appropriate for chil-
dren.158  It noted how video games often “mirror film and book
genres,” and gave examples that were likely to be familiar to the Jus-
tices.159 God of War, EMA explained, was based on Greek mythology
and depicted “the battles of the protagonist Kratos, who fights gods
and mythical beasts in a quest to redeem his own brutal past.”160
EMA’s descriptions minimized the role of violence:
Some games depict violence in graphic detail—as do some movies (such as
Saving Private Ryan, The Godfather, The Wild Bunch) and some classic litera-
ture (such as The Red Badge of Courage, Titus Andronicus, The Iliad).  And a
few games, like Postal 2 (which is virtually the only video game mentioned in
Petitioners’ brief), include satire or content intended to provoke or offend—
155. Id. at 11 (referencing the State’s physical exhibit lodged with the Court).  Be-
cause the California Brief does not describe the content of the videotape, this
description is from the Ninth Circuit’s decision.  Video Software Dealers Ass’n v.
Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2009).
156. Brief of Respondents, supra note 146, at 2 (citations omitted).
157. “More than two-thirds of American households include at least one player of
video games,” the average age of a player is thirty-four, and forty percent of play-
ers are women. Id. at 3–4.
158. Id. at 6 (“The vast majority (82 percent) of games sold . . . are rated as suitable for
children under seventeen.”).
159. Id. at 4–5.
160. Id. at 4.
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much as “transgressive” works in other media are intended to be
provocative.161
This last sentence both portrayed Postal 2 as relatively harmless and
called attention to the lack of examples in California’s brief.
EMA next tells how the video game industry voluntarily adopted a
comprehensive, industry-wide ratings system to inform consumers
about violent content.  It describes this system as being “remarkably
effective” in restricting children’s access to mature-rated video games
without parental involvement.162
c. A More Effective Statement of Facts
If California had been represented by a Supreme Court expert, he
or she would have understood that more detailed descriptions of the
extremely violent video games covered by the Statute would have
helped California’s case.  Because the Justices would likely know little
about video games in general, or violent video games in particular, it
was important to educate them.  Armed with more information about
violent video games, the Justices might have been more skeptical of
EMA’s claim that playing violent video games was essentially the
same as reading Greek myths or watching the movie Saving Private
Ryan.163
Justice Kagan has since admitted she knew little about video
games prior to the Brown case.164  She also described her colleagues
as “not necessarily the most technologically sophisticated people,” who
do not even use email.165  When Justice Kagan asked at oral argu-
ment if the California statute would apply to Mortal Kombat, “an
iconic game, which I’m sure half of the clerks who work for us spent
considerable amounts of time in their adolescence playing,” Justice
Scalia interjected, “I don’t know what she’s talking about.”166
161. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 8–9.
163. Brief of Respondents, supra note 146, at 6–7.  EMA had made the same or similar
analogies in its Brief in the Ninth Circuit.  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 6–7,
Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2008)
(No. 07-16620); Brief in Opposition at 5–7, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs.
Ass’n, 599 U.S. 1092 (2010) (No. 08-1448).
164. Fred Barbash, Why Two Supreme Court Justices Played a Violent Video Game to
Help Decide a Major Case, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/09/18/how-and-why-justices-kagan-
and-breyer-faced-off-in-a-violent-video-game-to-help-decide-a-major-case/ [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/5UXS-2YBH].
165. Michelle R. Smith, Kagan: Court Hasn’t Really ‘Gotten to’ Email, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Aug. 20, 2013).
166. Transcript of Oral Argument at 57, Schwarzenegger, 599 U.S. 1092 (No. 08-1448).
Justice Kagan was not personally familiar with Mortal Kombat.  Seeking a con-
crete example to test the limits of the California statute, she asked her clerks to
suggest a violent video game that most people would know about, and they sug-
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Justice Kagan continued to press California’s counsel to identify
specific games “[b]ecause I read your briefs all the way through, and
the only thing that I found—you said was clearly covered by this stat-
ute was Postal 2.  But presumably the statute applies to more than
one video game.”167  This exchange suggests the Justices would have
better understood what California was trying to accomplish if Califor-
nia had provided more detail about violent video games.
Only Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts asked questions at
oral argument that seemed to draw upon their own knowledge of video
games.  For example, Justice Alito challenged the EMA counsel:
And you say there is no problem because 16-year-olds in California never have
$50 available to go buy a video game, and because they never have TVs in
their room, and their parents are always home watching what they . . . do with
their video games, and the . . . video games have features that allow parents to
block access, to block the playing of violent video games, which can’t be over-
come by a computer-savvy California 16-year old, that’s why there is no prob-
lem, right?168
They were also the only Justices with children young enough that they
were likely to play video games.169
Even so, Justice Alito conducted “considerable independent re-
search to identify video games in which ‘the violence is astound-
ing.’”170  Justice Alito uncovered examples such as
games in which a player can take on the identity and reenact the killings
carried out by the perpetrators of the murders at Columbine High School and
Virginia Tech.  The objective of one game is to rape a mother and her daugh-
ters; in another, the goal is to rape Native American women.  There is a game
in which players engage in ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ and can choose to gun down
African-Americans, Latinos, or Jews.  In still another game, players attempt
to fire a rifle shot into the head of President Kennedy as his motorcade passes
by the Texas School Book Depository.171
gested Mortal Kombat.  HarvardLawSchool, Associate Justice Elena Kagan
Speaks with Dean Martha Minow, YOUTUBE (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=FWJkCDJMGH4 [https://perma.unl.edu/56PZ-KFZC] (view at
approximately 25:55).
167. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 166, at 11–12 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 52; see also id. at 29 (Chief Justice Roberts interrupted EMA counsel’s dis-
cussion of parental controls noting that “any 13-year-old can bypass parental con-
trols in about 5 minutes.”).
169. In 2005 when California adopted the statute, Justice Alito had a 19-year old son
and 17-year old daughter. The Alito Children: In their own words, UNDERNEATH
THEIR ROBES BLOG (Nov. 1, 2005), http://underneaththeirrobes.blogs.com/main/
2005/11/alito_kids.html [https://perma.unl.edu/39HV-MV2Z].  The Chief Justice’s
son was five and his daughter six in 2006.  By the time of the decision, they would
have been 10 and 11.  Joan Biskupic, Roberts Plays Dual Roles: Chief Justice and
Father, USA TODAY (June 26, 2006), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/wash
ington/2006-06-25-roberts_x.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/QT5L-HJX5].
170. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 789 (2011) (citations omitted).
171. Id. at 818–19 (citations omitted).
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Justice Alito likely felt compelled to conduct his own research because
California did not sufficiently convey the extreme violence in some
video games.
Other Justices gathered facts on their own, as well.  Justice Kagan
disclosed that she and Justice Breyer played the violent video game
that was most involved in the case.
So, he had his clerk set it up in his office, and I went over to his office and
there we were—you know—killing everybody left and right . . . It’s probably
reflective of the fact that we did come out on different sides of this [case] . . . .
Justice Breyer, I remember, thought it was all really horrible, really disgust-
ing, and repellant . . . And I was like “next round, next round.”172
Justice Breyer also gathered facts about the psychological impact
of playing such games.  With the assistance of the Supreme Court li-
brary, he compiled and attached to his opinion two appendixes (pro
and con) of peer-reviewed academic journal articles about psychologi-
cal harm from playing violent video games.173  If California had done
a better job describing the problem the statute was designed to ad-
dress, such additional research would not have been necessary.  More-
over, the Justices might have been more receptive to California’s
arguments if they were convinced that the problem addressed by the
statute was real and significant.
2. Arguments
After the Statement of Facts and before the Argument, briefs usu-
ally discuss the applicable standard of review.  The standard of review
governs the arguments that need to be made and the degree of evi-
dence required.  Often, the choice of a standard of review can deter-
mine the outcome.
a. Standards of Review
Courts generally employ one of three standards of review: rational
basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny.  Rational basis is a
very deferential standard.  The Court utilized rational-basis review in
Ginsberg.174  Most statutes survive rational-basis review.  In recent
years, however, courts have generally not applied rational-basis re-
view to regulations affecting speech.175
172. HarvardLawSchool, Associate Justice Elena Kagan Speaks with Dean Martha
Minow, YOUTUBE (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FWJkCD
JMGH4 [https://perma.unl.edu/R2RU-MQNM] (view at approximately 26:50).
173. Brown, 564 U.S. at 858–72.
174. See supra text accompanying note 69.
175. In 1969, the Court applied rational-basis scrutiny and upheld the FCC’s “fairness
doctrine,” which required broadcast stations to present both sides of controversial
issues of public importance.  Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
Then, in 1978, the Court upheld the constitutionality of an FCC action to enforce
the statutory prohibition against broadcasting indecent language.  FCC v.
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When a regulation has an impact on speech, courts generally re-
view it more carefully to protect any First Amendment interests that
might be at stake.  Courts first determine whether the statute is con-
tent-neutral or content-based.176  The “principal inquiry in determin-
ing content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a
regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the
message it conveys.”177
If the challenged statute is content-neutral, courts generally apply
“intermediate scrutiny.”178  A content-neutral statute will survive in-
termediate scrutiny if “it furthers an important or substantial govern-
mental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on al-
leged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.”179  This last prong does not require the
regulation to be the “least speech restrictive means of advancing the
Government’s interests.”  Rather, “[n]arrow tailoring in this context
requires . . . that the means chosen do not ‘burden substantially more
speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate inter-
ests.’”180  Under intermediate scrutiny, courts carefully balance the
interests on both sides, and so the outcome depends largely on the
facts presented.
Content-based restrictions are subject to “strict scrutiny.”  Strict
scrutiny requires the state to show that the regulation
is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to
serve that interest.  The State must specifically identify an “actual problem”
in need of solving, and the curtailment of free speech must be actually neces-
sary to the solution.  That is a demanding standard.  “It is rare that a regula-
tion restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.”181
b. California’s Arguments
California made three alternative arguments, depending upon the
applicable standard of review.  First, it argued for application of the
Ginsberg standard.182  It reasoned that because extremely violent
video games, like obscenity, were harmful to minors, the same inter-
ests present in Ginsberg—the need to protect minors from exposure to
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).  But subsequently in Turner, the Court ex-
plained that the “less rigorous standard of . . . scrutiny” is only used for broad-
casting or when reviewing the enforcement of a law of general applicability
applied to the press.  Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637–40 (1994).
176. Turner, 512 U.S. at 642.
177. Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 662 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
180. Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
181. Brown v. Entm’t. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (citations omitted).
182. This argument took up almost 35 out of 59 pages.  Petitioners’ Brief, supra note
154, at 12–47.
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harmful material and an independent interest in the well-being of
youth—justified California’s restriction on the sale of offensively vio-
lent video games to minors.
In the alternative, California argued for intermediate scrutiny.
Citing Turner, California argued the First Amendment does not de-
mand proof of a direct causal link between exposure to violent video
games and harm to minors when “the government defends a regula-
tion on speech as a means of preventing anticipated harms.”183
Rather, California argued, courts should uphold legislative predictive
judgments where the legislature had “drawn reasonable inferences
based on substantial evidence.”184  To require a state show a direct
causal link between playing violent video games and harm to minors
“would presumably entail experimentation on minors” that would be
both unethical and impractical.185  Thus, it was enough that the stud-
ies considered by the Legislature demonstrated a connection between
playing violent video games and increases in aggressive behavior by
children.186
Finally, California argued that even if strict scrutiny applied, the
Act was the “least restrictive means” of serving the State’s inter-
ests.187  The Ninth Circuit found that, assuming California had
demonstrated a compelling state interest, it had failed to show that a
less restrictive alternative, specifically an education campaign about
the ESRB rating system directed at retailers and parents, would not
achieve the state’s interests.188  California argued the Ninth Circuit
should have asked whether the “challenged regulation is the least re-
strictive means among available, effective alternatives.”189  Because
not all video games receive a rating from the ESRB, and the Federal
Trade Commission found that a large percentage of children were able
to purchase M-rated games without their parents, California argued
the suggested alternative was not effective.190
c. EMA’s Arguments
EMA argued that video games, including those depicting extreme
violence, were fully protected by the First Amendment.191  It charac-
terized California as contending “that depictions of violence either are
183. Id. at 48.
184. Id. (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)).
185. Id. at 48–49.
186. Id. at 56.
187. Id. at 56–59.
188. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 964–95 (9th Cir.
2009).
189. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 154, at 58 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656,
666 (2004)).
190. Id. at 57–58.
191. Brief of Respondents, supra note 146, at 17–23.
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obscenity, or have historically been regulated as the equivalent of ob-
scenity.”192  The first, EMA said, was wrong because obscenity was
limited to works depicting sexual content.193  The second was wrong
because the United States had no tradition of regulating violent
speech.194  While acknowledging that “[i]n the 1880s some states did
pass laws attempting to censor depictions of criminal behavior” it
pointed out that “these laws, and later attempts to censor movies in
the 20th century, were ultimately found to violate the First
Amendment.”195
EMA then characterized California as conceding it could not sat-
isfy strict scrutiny and arguing instead that “some expression to mi-
nors, even if entirely non-sexual in content, is unprotected by the First
Amendment.”196  EMA called California’s argument “radical” and as
“startling and dangerous” as that advanced by the Government in
Stevens.197
Finally, EMA argued that California could not meet strict scrutiny
because it failed “to show an actual harm to minors that the Act mate-
rially addresses.”198  It characterized California as seeking a deferen-
tial approach to legislators’ predictive judgments of harm because it
was “[u]nable to defend the evidence on its merits.”199  Moreover, Cali-
fornia’s reliance on Turner was misplaced.  The Turner majority af-
forded greater deference to the legislators because the Cable Act,
unlike the California statute, was content-neutral.200
EMA also argued the Act failed to materially advance an actual
harm because the State’s evidence showed that children could be
harmed by exposure to violent media content including books and
movies, but the Act only applied to some violent video games.201  Fi-
nally, EMA argued the Act was not narrowly tailored because it could
be used to censor a broad range of material and it drew “no distinc-
tions between a 17-year-old and a preschooler.”202
192. Id. at 20 (citations omitted).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 21.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 22.
197. Id. at 23 (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010)).  EMA also alleged
California’s position had “almost no stopping point because so many expressive
works contain violent depictions” that “someone could deem offensive for minors.”
Id. at 24.
198. Id. at 47.  The EMA found it “telling” that California had not even cited strict-
scrutiny cases. Id. at 49.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 50.
201. Id. at 51.
202. Id. at 52.
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3. California’s Risky Strategy
In the Supreme Court, California abandoned the argument it made
below that the Act survived strict scrutiny.  Instead, it focused on con-
vincing the Court to apply the Ginsberg standard.  With the benefit of
hindsight, this was a mistake.  If California had been represented by a
Supreme Court expert, it might have better appreciated the risks of
pursing this strategy.
This is not to say California had no reason to argue for the Gins-
berg standard.  It is a much easier standard to meet than strict scru-
tiny.  Also, although the argument for applying the Ginsberg standard
to violent content had been around for many years,203 every court
since the district court in Kendrick had rejected its use.204  Unless the
Supreme Court found that Ginsberg supplied the correct standard of
review, no lower court would employ it.
Moreover, California’s counsel may have interpreted some recent
Supreme Court decisions as implying the Court would be receptive to
affording differential treatment to minors.  In 2005, the Court held in
Roper v. Simmons that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments pro-
hibited the execution of an individuals who committed a capital crime
under age eighteen.205  In 2010, the Court found the imposition of a
life sentence with no possibility of parole on a juvenile who committed
a non-capital offense also violated the Eighth Amendment.206  Califor-
nia argued these cases showed there were “physiological reasons why
minors are not yet capable of exercising the full panoply of constitu-
tional rights” and that minors were more susceptible to harmful
effects.207
California also relied on the 2009 decision in FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc.208  There, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) found the broadcast of “fleeting expletives” violated the law
against indecent broadcasts, a law the FCC defended in the name of
protecting children.209  On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the
FCC’s action likely violated the First Amendment, but reversed the
FCC for being arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.210  The FCC sought Supreme Court review.  In the
203. Professor Saunders had argued that violence was comparable to obscenity and
that the Ginsberg standard should apply to violent media as far back as 1994.
Kevin W. Saunders, Media Violence and the Obscenity Exception to the First
Amendment, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 107 (1994). See generally KEVIN W.
SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY (1996).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 79–80.
205. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
206. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
207. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 154, at 25.
208. 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (Fox I)
209. Id. at 509–10.
210. Id. at 510–11.
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Supreme Court, the networks argued the indecency prohibition was
an unconstitutional content-based restriction on their speech and
urged the Court to overturn the 1978 Pacifica211 decision, which held
that prohibiting indecent broadcasts did not violate the First Amend-
ment.  The Supreme Court, however, declined to reach the First
Amendment issues, and instead reversed the Second Circuit’s finding
that the FCC acted arbitrarily.212
One reason the Second Circuit found the FCC’s action arbitrary
was that the FCC lacked evidence showing that fleeting expletives
harmed children.  The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia,
held that no empirical data was required:
There are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be mar-
shaled, and the harmful effect of broadcast profanity on children is one of
them.  One cannot demand a multiyear controlled study, in which some chil-
dren are intentionally exposed to indecent broadcasts (and insulated from all
other indecency), and others are shielded from all indecency. . . . Here it suf-
fices to know that children mimic the behavior they observe—or at least the
behavior that is presented to them as normal and appropriate.213
Justice Scalia added that if enforcement of the ban on indecent broad-
casts “had to be supported by empirical data, the ban would effectively
be a nullity.”214  And even though the FCC “had adduced no quantifi-
able measure of the harm caused by the language in Pacifica,” the
Court held that the “government’s interest in the ‘well-being of its
youth’ . . . justified the regulation of otherwise protected
expression.”215
After the Roper and Fox decisions, however, the Supreme Court
declined to use the Ginsberg standard in Stevens.  As discussed above,
Stevens found unconstitutional a federal ban on depictions of animal
cruelty.  It rejected the Government’s claim that such depictions, like
obscenity, were categorically unprotected by the First Amendment.216
The Stevens Court rejected as “startling and dangerous” the govern-
ment’s contention that Congress had made a legislative judgment that
depictions of animals being tortured were of such minimal redeeming
social value that they were unworthy of First Amendment protec-
211. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
212. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 529.  On remand, the Second Circuit found the FCC’s policy
was unconstitutionally vague and had a chilling effect.  Fox Television Stations,
Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010).  This time, the Supreme Court upheld
the Second Circuit, but only on the ground that the FCC violated the networks’
due process rights by failing to give fair notice that a fleeting expletive could be
actionably indecent.  FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012).
Once again, the Court declined to address the First Amendment implications of
the FCC’s indecency policy or revisit its Pacifica decision. Id.
213. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 519.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 519–20 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978)).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 124–28.
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tion.217  The Court did, however, recognize the possibility that a cate-
gory of speech might exist that had been unprotected historically but
not yet been identified in case law.
California’s response to Stevens was to try to make the case that
offensively violent material was one such category.218  To show that
violent content had been unprotected historically, California claimed
state laws “reflect a societal understanding that violent material can
be just as harmful to the well-being of minors as sexually explicit ma-
terial.”219  It cited several examples, including an 1889 Illinois statute
making it a crime to distribute to minors publications principally de-
voted to “pictures and stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime,” and
a 1956 Rhode Island statute prohibiting the sale to minors of “comic
books devoted to crime, sex, horror, terror, brutality and violence.”220
This strategy was unsuccessful because these examples actually rein-
forced the industry’s claim that the State was simply overacting to a
new form of media.
A Supreme Court expert would have advised California of the sub-
stantial risks in placing so much reliance on Ginsberg.  The language
from Fox case could hardly be read as a ringing endorsement of Gins-
berg. Fox was a 5–4 decision with six separate opinions.  Justice
Thomas wrote a concurring opinion questioning the viability of the
two precedents—Red Lion and Pacifica—supporting the FCC’s claim
of constitutional authority.221  The four dissenting Justices thought
the FCC had construed Pacifica too broadly.222  Because the reason-
ing in Pacifica was based in part on Ginsberg, and five Justices in Fox
were skeptical whether Pacifica remained good law (or if it did,
whether it could be applied in any other circumstances), it seems
likely those five Justices would be unwilling to extend Ginsberg to the
different circumstances presented in the California video game case.
Moreover, after Stevens, it should have been obvious that Califor-
nia would be unlikely to convince the Court to use the Ginsberg stan-
dard.  At the very least, a more experienced Supreme Court advocate
would have tried to distinguish Stevens on the grounds that the stat-
ute prohibited the sale of the offending content to everyone, while the
California statute applied only to minors.223
217. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010).
218. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 154, at 13.
219. Id. at 34–36.
220. Id. at 34–35 (emphasis omitted).
221. Fox I, 556 U.S. 502, 530 (2009).
222. Id. at 539 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 544–46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); 546–67
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
223. Justice Alito distinguished the cases for this reasons and disagreed with the ma-
jority that Stevens was controlling.  Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786,
813–14 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring).
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B. Alternative Arguments
In fact, California had other options it could have pursued.  With
expert counsel, California might have garnered the necessary five
votes by arguing for a standard of review that, while not as deferential
as Ginsberg, was easier to meet than strict scrutiny.
1. Facial Challenge
While California’s Statement of Facts described the industry chal-
lenge as a facial one, its brief never argued that the posture of the case
affected the standard of review.  Instead, California’s counsel tried to
make this point for the first time at the end of his rebuttal at oral
argument.224
Facial challenges are generally disfavored because they raise the
risk of premature interpretation of a statute, run contrary to princi-
ples of judicial restraint, and frustrate the intent of the elected repre-
sentatives.225  For this reason, it is usually more difficult to win a
facial challenge than an applied challenge.
The Stevens case involved a facial challenge.  The Court noted that
to win a facial challenge, a party would have to meet the test in Sa-
lerno, “that no set of circumstances exists under which [the statute]
would be valid,”226 or under Glucksberg, that the statute lacks any
“plainly legitimate sweep.”227  However, the Justices disagreed
whether the same standards should apply in a facial challenge to a
statute restricting speech.  Without deciding exactly what standard
applied, the Stevens Court recognized “a second type of facial chal-
lenge,” whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if “a substan-
tial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation
to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”228
California might have been more successful had it emphasized that
this case involved a facial challenge.  Justice Breyer would have up-
held the statute in part because it was a facial challenge.229  Justice
224. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 166, at 59.  Morazzini said “this is a
facial challenge.  This statute has not been applied has not been even construed
by a state or federal court below, but—.”  At that point, the Chief Justice said
“[t]hank you, counsel” and the argument was over.
225. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450–51
(2008).
226. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (citing United States v. Sa-
lerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
227. Id. (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 740 & n.7 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment).
228. Id. (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. at 449,
n.6 (2008).  The Stevens Court concluded that the statute was so broad it would
fail both on its face and as applied. Id. at 1590–91.
229. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 841 (citing Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577,
1587 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer believed that the State could
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Thomas thought the industry’s challenge failed “[u]nder any of this
Court’s standards for a facial First Amendment challenge.”230  At oral
argument, the Chief Justice asked EMA counsel “whether you use the
Salerno test or the Glucksberg test, if there is either one or any appli-
cations that would satisfy the Constitution, the facial challenge fails.
Right?”  He suggested that although a law prohibiting the sale of “a
less violent game” to a 17-year-old might violate the First Amend-
ment, “something like Postal 2 sold to a 10-year-old might
well . . . not.”231  Thus, had California stressed that facial challenges
such as this one were disfavored, it would have had a better chance of
getting the five votes it needed.
2. Intermediate Scrutiny
Another way to lower the level of scrutiny would have been to ar-
gue that the statute was content-neutral and therefore, subject only to
intermediate scrutiny.  But California never made this argument, nor
did it ever challenge EMA’s claim that the statute was content-based.
California could have argued the statute regulated conduct (that
is, the sale to minors) and had only an incidental effect on speech.  The
statute was not intended to restrict access by minors based on the
ideas or messages contained in video games.  Indeed, as the EMA
pointed out, video games utilize violence for a variety of reasons,
mostly relating to the storyline.  It was irrelevant under the California
statute whether if, as EMA claimed, Medal of Honor: Frontline told a
story about D-Day,232 the Western-themed Red Dead Redemption por-
trayed “a violent, unvarnished cruel world of sexism and bigotry” that
raised questions about ethics,233 or Postal 2 was a satire designed to
be “over the top.”234  The only thing that mattered was whether the
game met all three prongs of the statutory definition of a “violent
video game.”
At oral argument, the Chief Justice expressed skepticism about
whether the statute was content-based.  He asked Smith why they
legitimately apply its statute to “sales to minors under the age of 17 (the age
cutoff used by the industry’s own ratings system), of highly realistic violent video
games, which a reasonable game maker would know meet the Act’s criteria.” Id.
230. Id. at 839.
231. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 166, at 40–41.  Smith’s response was
first to quibble about whether those tests applied to facial challenges in the First
Amendment context.  Then he contended that even if the sale of some games
could be constitutionally prohibited, the California law was too broad and there
was no way that “anybody is going to be able to come back and draw a statute
that gets to what they claim, because the English language is not susceptible of
that level of precision.” Id. at 41–43.
232. Brief of Respondents, supra note 146, at 2–3.
233. Id. at 4–5.
234. Id. at 34.
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could not treat video games rated for adults like cigarettes—“on the
top shelf out of reach of children.”235  Smith answered that “cigarettes
are not speech,” to which the Chief Justice observed that cigarettes
are harmful to children and some have concluded that the video games
are likewise harmful to children.236
The incidental effects on speech, moreover, would be modest.  The
statute did not restrict the creation of violent games, limit their sale to
adults, or prohibit anyone, including minors, from playing the games.
As Justice Breyer put it, the only thing the statute “prevents is a child
or adolescent from buying, without a parent’s assistance, a grue-
somely violent video game of a kind that the industry itself tells us it
wants to keep out of the hands of those under the age of 17.”237
Thus, California might have persuaded a majority that the statute
was content-neutral and subject only to intermediate scrutiny, if it
had made that argument.
3. Whose First Amendment Rights?
California could have—but did not—argue in the lower court that
the only right at issue here was that of a minor to purchase violent
video games without parental consent.  One commenter has argued
that “[a]ssuming arguendo, that there is a constitutional right to be
free from parental control and that it is a right that could be pursued
on jus tertii standing, the EMA still does not meet the requirements
for jus tertii standing to assert this right on behalf of its child custom-
ers.”238  Although EMA could have asserted its own rights, it would
not have met the criteria for asserting the rights of minors because it
lacked a “close relationship” with children and its economic interests
had nothing to do with children’s well-being.239
Framing the issue as whether video game companies had a First
Amendment right to sell violent video games to minors without paren-
tal consent would have been consistent with the argument that the
statute regulated conduct, not speech.  It also would have made clear
whose rights were actually at issue.  Yet, California did not frame the
case in this manner.
Presumably, California chose not to make this argument because it
was so intent on persuading the Court to use the Ginsberg standard.
The premise of Ginsberg is that “states may properly restrict minors’
235. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 166, at 51.
236. Id. at 52.
237. Brown v. Entm’t. Merchs. Ass’n., 564 U.S. 786, 848–49 (2011) (citation omitted).
238. Margaret E. Jennings, Blood, Brains, and Bludgeoning, But not Breasts: An
Analysis and Critique of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 32 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 87, 116–117 (2012).
239. Id. at 117–18.   This Article concludes the Brown Court based its ruling on the
First Amendment rights of a party not before it.
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access to material that is fully protected as to adults.”240  California
conceded that adults had a First Amendment right to purchase violent
video games, but argued that minors’ First Amendment rights were
less extensive than those of adults.241
EMA responded by defending the First Amendment rights of mi-
nors.  It argued that, as a general rule, minors enjoy the protection of
the First Amendment and that government may not suppress speech
solely to protect young people from ideas or images that a legislative
body thinks are unsuitable for them.242  It then argued that cases
where the Court found that government could constitutionally pro-
hibit public dissemination of protected materials to minors were lim-
ited to two specific settings: schools and broadcasting.243
Presumably because both sides characterized the case as about the
First Amendment rights of minors, none of the Justices questioned
whose rights were actually at stake.244  The majority found the Cali-
fornia statute was “seriously overinclusive because it abridges the
First Amendment rights of young people whose parents (and aunts and
uncles) think violent video games are a harmless pastime.”245
4. Strict Scrutiny
Finally, California could have done a better job arguing the statute
met the test for strict scrutiny.  In the Ninth Circuit, California ar-
gued that if Ginsberg did not apply, the Act would survive strict scru-
tiny because it represented “the least restrictive means through which
the State can effectively achieve its [compelling] goal[ ] of helping par-
ents . . . protect[ ] [their children] from harm caused by playing offen-
sively violent video games.”246  But, California took a different tack in
its Petition for Certiorari where it argued the State should not be re-
quired to demonstrate that playing violent video games directly
240. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 154, at 12.  California devoted thirty-five pages to
arguing the statute is constitutional under Ginsberg and only eleven to other
arguments.
241. Id. at 28.
242. Brief of Respondents, supra note 146, at 25.
243. Id. at 25–27.
244. Indeed, Justice Thomas was the only one who even recognized that two different
alleged rights were at issue.  He believed the concept of free speech as originally
understood did “not include a right to speak to minors (or a right of minors to
access speech) without going through the minors’ parents or guardians.” Brown,
564 U.S. at 821 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  He explained that the colonialists held
very different conceptions of parental authority and childhood than we have to-
day.  Parents had complete authority over their children and were expected to
direct their development by, among other things, monitoring the books they read.
Id. at 823–25.
245. Id. at 805 (majority opinion) (emphasis added); see also id. at 794–99 (discussing
First Amendment rights of minors).
246. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 154, at 41.
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caused harm to minors.247  Instead, citing Turner, California argued
the government need only show the legislature had “drawn reasonable
inferences based on substantial evidence.”248
In opposing certiorari, EMA correctly pointed out that Turner re-
quired a lesser showing because the statute at issue was “content neu-
tral” rather than “content based.”249  Expert Supreme Court counsel
surely would have addressed EMA’s point in its merits brief.  But Cal-
ifornia did not, and instead made essentially the same argument it
made in its Petition for Certiorari.250  California could have argued
that, even if strict scrutiny applied, it fully satisfied that test.  This
approach, however, would have required California to present evi-
dence that the statute served a compelling government interest, some-
thing it did not even try to do in its Supreme Court brief.
In sum, it is fair to conclude that if California had been repre-
sented by a Supreme Court specialist, it might have been able to
frame its arguments to attract five votes for overturning the Ninth
Circuit.
C. Amicus Briefs
A voluminous literature demonstrates that amicus curiae briefs in-
fluence judicial behavior.  They can influence, among other things, a
party’s success, the number of separate opinions, and the content of
the Court’s opinions.251  As a result, parties, especially those with ex-
perienced attorneys who understand the value of amici, often solicit
amici.252
The number of amicus briefs filed in recent years has increased
steadily.253  On average, nine amicus briefs were filed in merits cases
247. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 115, at 12.
248. Id. at 5.
249. Brief in Opposition to Certiorari, supra note 122, at 32.  In Turner, the majority
found that the statute was content-neutral while the dissenters thought it was
content-based.  Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
250. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 154, at 48 (citing Turner, 512 U.S. at 666).
251. Paul M. Collins Jr. et al., Me Too? An Investigation of Repetition in U.S. Supreme
Court Amicus Curiae Briefs, 97 JUDICATURE 228 (2014); see also Paul M. Collins
Jr. et al., The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion
Content, 49 Law & Soc’y. Rev. 917 (2015) (examining the extent to which amicus
briefs contribute to majority opinions).  For a summary of studies on the impact of
amicus briefs, see Claire B. Wofford, Assessing the Anecdotes: Amicus Curiae, Le-
gal Rules, and the U.S. Supreme Court, 36 JUST. SYS. J. 274, 276 (2015).
252. MATTHEW M.C. ROBERTS, ORAL ARGUMENT AND AMICUS CURIAE 31 (2011).  Laza-
rus explains that “amicus briefs, more than the mere self-interested ipse dixit of
the petitioner, can demonstrate that the legal issue is important.  Members of the
elite Supreme Court Bar, accordingly, affirmatively recruit the filing of amicus
especially at the certiorari stage.”  Lazarus, supra note 27, at 1513.
253. Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, Record Breaking Term for Amicus Cu-
riae in Supreme Court Reflects New Norm, NAT’L L.J.: SUP. CT. BRIEF (Aug. 19,
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during the 2010 term.254 Brown came in well above the average for
the term with thirty-one, of which only four supported California.
With so many briefs, not all will receive the same amount of atten-
tion.  One study found that Supreme Court clerks gave the highest
consideration to amicus briefs from the Solicitor General’s office, fol-
lowed by amicus briefs filed by states, other government entities, and
public-interest groups.255  Among public-interest groups, the ACLU
was most often mentioned.256  After the ACLU came professional as-
sociations, the NAACP, the AFL-CIO, and U.S. Chamber of
Commerce.257
Clerks also reported they were more inclined to give careful consid-
eration to an amicus brief filed by a prominent academic or estab-
lished member of the Supreme Court bar, especially a former Solicitor
General.258  Finally, “86% reported that an amicus brief filed [jointly]
by ideologically opposed groups would be noteworthy.”259
1. Briefs Supporting California
Leland Yee, the sponsor of the California statute, who had since
been elected to the state senate, filed an amicus brief jointly with the
California Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics and the
California Psychological Association.260  This brief acknowledged that
“[p]laying a lot of violent games is unlikely to turn a normal youth
with zero, one or even two other risk factors into a killer.  But . . .
playing a lot of video games is likely to increase the frequency and the
seriousness of his or her physical aggression, both in the short term
and over time as the youth grows up.”261
2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/supremecourtbrief/id=1202735095655
/Record-Breaking-Term-for-Amicus-Curiae-in-Supreme-Court-Reflects-New-
Norm; Mark Walsh, Frequent Filers: It Was Another Big Term for Amicus Curiae
Briefs at the High Court, 99 A.B.A. J.  16 (2013).
254. Franze & Anderson, supra note 253.
255. Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Cu-
riae Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33, 46, 48–49 (2004).
256. Id. at 49.
257. Id. at 50.  Clerks reported they were more likely to read briefs from these organi-
zations because of their reputation for high quality. Id. at 46.
258. Id. at 52–55.
259. Id. at 63.
260. Yee’s attorney, Steven F. Gruel, is a well-known former prosecutor and now crim-
inal defense attorney in San Francisco.  Gruel does not appear to have any prior
Supreme Court experience. Steven F. Gruel Attorney Profile, SUPER LAWYERS,
http://profiles.superlawyers.com/california-northern/san-francisco/lawyer/steven-
f-gruel/19416dc6-98da-426e-bd30-9e73c4281ebb.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
RXT4-Q4XP].
261. Brief of Amicus Curiae of California State Senator Leland Y. Yee et al., supra
note 82, at 16.
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This brief cited many studies linking the playing of violent video
games with harm to minors.  In particular, it emphasized that studies
conducted since 2005 confirmed the findings relied upon by the Cali-
fornia legislature.262  For example, a meta-analysis conducted by lead-
ing U.S. and Japanese researchers in 2010 “concluded that the
scientific debate should move beyond the simple question whether vio-
lent video game play is a causal risk factor for behavior because: ‘sci-
entific literature has effectively and clearly shown the answer to be
“yes.”’”263
Appended to this brief was a “Statement on Video Game Violence”
authored by thirteen scientists, scholars and researchers including
Dr. Anderson, and endorsed by more than one hundred scholars, re-
searchers and professionals.  It stated in part:
Extensive research has been conducted over many years using all three major
types of research designs (experimental, cross-sectional, and longitudinal).
Numerous original empirical research studies have been conducted on chil-
dren and adolescents.  Overall, the research data conclude that exposure to
violent video games causes an increase in the likelihood of aggressive behav-
ior.  The effects are both immediate and long term. . . . In addition to causing
an increase in the likelihood of aggressive behavior, violent video games have
also been found to increase aggressive thinking, aggressive feelings, physio-
logical desensitization to violence, and to decrease pro-social behavior.264
Common Sense Media, a California-based advocacy group, also
filed a supportive brief written by two law professors: Kevin Saunders
of Michigan State University, who authored many articles arguing for
the Ginsberg test to apply to violent media,265 and Theodore Shaw of
Columbia, a well-known academic and former NAACP litigator.266
This brief argued that the First Amendment rights of children were
limited with regard to violent video games because children’s minds
were different from adults and more susceptible to harm.267  It also
262. See id. at 5 (referring to the brief’s meta-analysis of 130 studies regarding the
effects of playing violent video games).
263. Id. at 25 (citing Craig Anderson et al., Violent Video Game Effects on Aggression,
Empathy, and Prosocial Behavior in Eastern and Western Countries: A Meta-Ana-
lytic Review, 136 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 151 (2010)).
264. Id. at 1a (appendix).
265. See supra note 203.
266. At that time, Shaw was a Professor of Law at Columbia and of counsel at Ful-
bright & Jaworski. Theodore M. Shaw, UNC SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.unc.
edu/faculty/directory/shawtheodorem/ [https://perma.unl.edu/J2Y9-EX9J].  Previ-
ously, Shaw worked for over twenty years for the NAACP Legal Defense and Ed-
ucational Fund, where he was “instrumental in drafting the admissions policy
that was upheld by the Supreme Court in its 2003 Grutter v. Bollinger decision.”
He served as lead counsel for interveners in the companion case Gratz v. Bollin-
ger. Shaw Honored at SJI Dinner, COLUM. L. SCH. MAG., Spring 2014, at 10.
While Shaw has some Supreme Court experience, it is not clear whether he
would meet Lazarus’s criteria for a Supreme Court expert.
267. Brief of Common Sense Media as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3–10,
Brown, 564 U.S. 786 (No. 08-1448).
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argued that at the time of the framing of the Constitution and Bill of
Rights, freedom of expression would not have been understood to in-
clude a right to expose children to harmful entertainment content.268
Louisiana, joined by ten other states, filed a brief supporting Cali-
fornia.  Analogizing the California law to state restrictions on minors
regarding voting, marriage, contracts, and privacy, they concluded
that “California’s law falls squarely within the limits on juvenile free-
doms which this court has upheld.”269
The conservative Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense Fund
also filed a brief supporting California.  It argued that playing video
games is conduct, not speech, and that the statute should be subject
only to rational-basis review.270
2. Briefs Supporting EMA
Some of the briefs supporting the EMA directly responded to amici
supporting California.  For example, Supreme Court specialist Patri-
cia Millett,271 filed a brief responding to the evidentiary claims of Cal-
ifornia and Senator Yee.272  This brief was filed on behalf of “82
scholars with expertise in psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, crimi-
nology, media studies, communication, and other fields” with “exten-
sive experience with the research regarding the effects on individuals
of media violence, including violence in video games.”273  This brief
relied heavily on the publications of one of the listed scholars, Christo-
pher J. Ferguson.274  It argued that the “problem confronting Califor-
nia and Senator Yee . . . is not the constitutional standard; it is simply
their inability to meet that standard in this case because validated
scientific studies prove the opposite, leaving no empirical foundation
for the assertion that playing violent video games causes harm to
minors.”275
268. Id. at 12–16.
269. Brief of Louisiana et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, Brown, 564
U.S. 786 (No. 08-1448).
270. Brief of Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund in Support
of Petitioners at 7, Brown, 564 U.S. 786 (No. 08-1448).
271. At the time, she had argued 32 cases in the Supreme Court. Patricia A. Millet,
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/content
/VL+-+Judges+-+PAM [https://perma.unl.edu/J3WH-U6BD].  Ms. Millett cur-
rently serves as a judge on the D.C. Circuit. Id.
272. Brief of Social Scientists et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Brown,
564 U.S. 786 (No. 08-1448).
273. Id. at 1.
274. The brief cites eleven articles written or co-authored by Ferguson. Id. at iv–vi.
See supra text accompanying note 15.
275. Brief of Social Scientists, supra note 272, at 35.  A quantitative analysis of the
publications by experts who signed on to Senator Lee’s amicus brief compared to
those who signed on to the Millet brief found “an enormous disparity of relevant
(i.e., violence and aggression in general, or media violence in particular) expertise
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Nine states led by Rhode Island jointly filed an amicus brief “tak-
ing the unusual position of opposing a fellow state and arguing for
restrictions on their authority.”276  While agreeing with California
that states have broad authority to regulate conduct and to treat mi-
nors differently in many areas, the Rhode Island brief argued states
may not restrict speech unless they can meet the test of strict scru-
tiny.277  It also argued the California law would “work against the
goal of effective law enforcement” by diverting resources from other
responsibilities and lending credence to criminal defenses seeking
mitigation based on behaviors learned from playing video games.278
The United States Chamber of Commerce also filed a brief support-
ing the EMA.  In recent years, the Chamber has been remarkably suc-
cessful in influencing Supreme Court decisions by filing amicus
briefs.279  In this case, the Chamber was represented by Supreme
Court specialist Lisa Blatt.280
Organizations ranging from the ACLU to the Cato Institute also
filed briefs supporting the EMA.281  Some briefs were filed jointly on
between the experts supporting California and those supporting the violent video
game merchants.”  Deanna Pollard Sacks et al., Do Violent Video Games Harm
Children? Comparing the Scientific Amicus Curiae Experts in Brown v. En-
tertainment Merchants Association, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1, at 10
(2011).
276. Greg Stohr, Violent Video Game Limits Questioned at High Court, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 2, 2010), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2010-11-02/california-
sales-curb-on-violent-video-games-questioned-by-u-s-high-court.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/2WDW-VPQW].  According to supporters of the law, the video
game industry conducted an intensive lobbying effort to get these states to file.
Id.
277. Brief of Rhode Island et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11,
Brown, 564 U.S. 786 (No. 08-1448).
278. Id. at 3–4.
279. See, e.g., David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business-Friendly Court? Explaining
the Chamber of Commerce’s Success at the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1019 (2009); John Shiffman, Chamber of Commerce Forms its Own Elite Law
Team, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-scotus-firms-
chamber-idUSKBN0JM10Q20141208 [https://perma.unl.edu/UY43-8B5B]
(“[P]erhaps no other national advocacy organization has so embraced the trend
toward Supreme Court specialization as the chief American business lobby, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce.”); Lazarus, supra note 27, at 1505–06.
280. Lisa Blatt heads Arnold & Porter LLP’s Appellate and Supreme Court practice.
At the time of publishing, she has argued thirty-five cases before the Supreme
Court, and prevailed in thirty-two. Lisa S. Blatt, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, http://
www.arnoldporter.com/en/people/b/blatt-lisa-s [https://perma.unl.edu/2QFY-
CSER].
281. The ACLU brief focused on the fact that the California statue did not expressly
address online sales of violent video games to minors.  It argued that if the law
applied, it would “inevitably burden the First Amendment rights of adults as well
as minors” because sellers have no effective means to determine the age of a pur-
chaser.  If the statute does not apply, then it would be completely ineffective.
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behalf of ideologically opposed groups.  William R. Stein,282 for exam-
ple, filed a brief on behalf of both the anti-regulatory Competitive En-
terprise Institute and consumer groups, such as Consumer Federation
of America, that traditionally favor regulation.283
All of the major trade associations supported the EMA, including
the Motion Picture Association of America represented by Supreme
Court expert Kannon K. Shanmugam,284 the National Cable and Tele-
communications Association represented by Supreme Court specialist
H. Bartow Farr III,285 and the National Association of Broadcasters
represented by Supreme Court expert Robert A. Long Jr.286  In addi-
tion, Supreme Court expert and former Solicitor General Ted Olson
filed a brief on behalf of Microsoft.
A group of prominent First Amendment scholars, including Profes-
sors David Cole, Kenneth Karst, Martin H. Redish, and William W.
Van Alstyne, filed a joint brief co-authored by Eugene Volokh, a well-
known professor at UCLA School of Law.  This brief argued against
using the Ginsberg standard because that case was premised on a
broad and longstanding social consensus concerning the inappropri-
ateness of sexual material for minors, while no comparable consensus
existed regarding violent speech.
Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 5–6, Brown, 564 U.S. 786 (No. 08-1448).
282. Stein is the head of Hughes Hubbard’s Appellate Practice Group, and so would
likely qualify as a Supreme Court expert. See William R. Stein, HUGHES HUB-
BARD & REED LLP, http://www.hugheshubbard.com/william-r-stein/attorney.aspx
[https://perma.unl.edu/V579-4F9U]; Appellate, HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP,
https://www.hugheshubbard.com/experience-results/appellate [https://
perma.unl.edu/Q5ZW-2G25].
283. Brief for the Entertainment Consumers Association et al. in Support of Respon-
dents, Brown, 564 U.S. 786 (No. 08-1448). Another amicus brief was filed by
ideologically adverse organizations: the Progress & Freedom Foundation and the
Electronic Frontier Foundation. See Brief of the Progress & Freedom Foundation
and the Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon-
dents, Brown, 564 U.S. 786 (No. 08-1448).
284. Shanmugam currently heads the Supreme Court practice at Williams and Con-
nolly.  At the time of publishing, he has had twenty oral arguments before the
Supreme Court, worked in the Solicitor General’s office, and clerked for Justice
Scalia. Kannon K. Shanmugam, WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP, https://
www.wc.com/kshanmugam [https://perma.unl.edu/53P6-7JF5].
285. Farr has had 32 Supreme Court oral arguments, including Turner.  H. Bartow
Farr, BANCROFT PLLC, http://www.bancroftpllc.com/who-we-are/h-bartow-farr/
[https://perma.unl.edu/LK5G-NRA9].
286. Robert A. Long Jr., an attorney at Covington and Burling, has argued before the
Supreme Court eighteen times at the time of publishing. Robert A. Long, COVING-
TON & BURLING, https://www.cov.com/en/professionals/l/robert-long [https://
perma.unl.edu/H92P-54YT]. See also Janet Roberts et al., supra note 34, in The
Echo Chamber, supra note 29.
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3. Influence of Amicus Briefs
One way to assess the impact of amicus briefs is to see how often
they were cited in opinions.  In Brown, the Justices cited industry-side
briefs more often than California-side briefs.  And interestingly, Jus-
tices Scalia and Alito, who cited the fewest amicus briefs in the 2012
term,287 cited the most amicus briefs in Brown.
Justice Scalia cited the Cato Institute’s brief three times, as well as
the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund brief, to show that historically,
new forms of entertainment thought to be harmful to children turned
out to be benign.288  Justice Scalia also cited the Rhode Island brief to
counter an argument made by Justice Breyer in dissent.289
Justice Alito cited several industry-side amicus briefs to criticize
the majority opinion.  For example, he chastised the majority for “not
mention[ing] the fact that the industry adopted [the ratings] system in
response to the threat of federal regulation . . .  a threat that the
Court’s opinion may now be seen as largely eliminating.”290  Justice
Alito also challenged the Court’s view that interactivity in video
games was nothing new, citing RTNDA’s brief to show that “[s]ome
amici who support respondents foresee the day when ‘virtual-reality
shoot-‘em-ups’ will allow children to ‘actually feel the splatting blood
from the blown-off head’ of a victim.”291  Finally, he observed that the
“International Game Developers Association (IGDA)—a group that
presumably understands the nature of video games and that supports
respondents—tells us that video games are ‘far more concretely inter-
active’” than literature.292
Only Justice Thomas cited amici in support of California.  He cited
Common Sense Media’s brief to argue it was absurd to suggest the
founding generation understood freedom of speech to include the right
to speak to minors without going through their parents.293  He also
cited the Brief for Louisiana et al., for examples of state support for
parental authority.294
287. Walsh, supra note 253, at 17.
288. Brown, 564 U.S. at 797.
289. In taking issue with Justice Breyer’s conclusion that the statute was necessary
because twenty percent of minors were able to buy M-rated games, Justice Scalia
referred to a study cited in the Rhode Island brief finding that a comparable per-
centage of minors were able to purchase alcohol.  Id. at 803 n.9.
290. Id. at 815 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae Activision Bliz-
zard, Inc. in Support of Respondents at 7–10, Brown, 564 U.S. 786 (No. 08-1448)).
291. Id. at 817 (citing Brief of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 29, Brown, 564 U.S. 786 (No. 08-
1448) (internal quotation marks omitted).
292. Id. at 819 (citing Brief of International Game Developers Association and Acad-
emy of Interactive Arts and Sciences as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at
3, Brown, 564 U.S. 786 (No. 08-1448)).
293. Id. at 822 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 837.
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In sum, it appears being represented by a Supreme Court expert
gave EMA an advantage over California in terms of amicus briefs.
EMA was able to solicit far more supporting briefs, including ones di-
rectly countering the amicus briefs supporting California.  At least
seven amicus briefs supporting the EMA bore the names of Supreme
Court experts,295 while none supporting California did.  The majority
opinion cited three amicus briefs supporting EMA and none support-
ing California.  And finally, the EMA had supporting briefs from both
liberal and conservative organizations, including the influential
ACLU, a factor that might have made it more comfortable for the
three liberal Justices to join Justice Scalia’s opinion.
D. Oral Argument
In addition to amicus briefs, another important factor in the out-
come of a decision is the oral argument.  Political scientists who study
the Supreme Court have found that
oral arguments provide information that can reduce the Justices’ uncertainty
regarding aspects of a case.  While the Justices generally come to these pro-
ceedings after reading the written briefs and the lower court record, they often
still face some degree of uncertainty regarding what are generally complex
legal and factual issues.  The Justices, for example, need an understanding of
the legal status quo, the policy choices available to them, the likely effect that
different legal rulings will have on the litigants and other similarly situated
parties, and the like.296
Moreover, oral argument is likely to have the most impact in very
close cases.297
With the exception of Justice Thomas,298 most of the Justices that
heard the Brown oral argument acknowledge the importance of oral
argument.  Chief Justice Roberts has written that “oral argument is
terribly, terribly important.”299  Because the voting conference is held
soon after the oral argument, the discussion at the conference tends to
focus on what took place at oral argument.300
295. Millett, Stein, Blatt, Shanmugam, Farr, Long, and Olsen.
296. Timothy R. Johnson et al., Oral Advocacy Before the United States Supreme
Court: Does it Affect the Justices’ Decisions? 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 457, 461–62
(2007). See also RYAN BLACK ET AL., ORAL ARGUMENTS AND COALITION FORMATION
ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A DELIBERATE DIALOGUE  5–6 (2012) (summarizing
studies).
297. Michael Duvall, When Is Oral Argument Important? A Judicial Clerk’s View of
the Debate, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 121, 123 (2007).
298. Justice Thomas has been quoted as saying, “I don’t see the need for all those
questions.  I think justices 99 percent of the time, have their minds made up
when they go to the bench.” LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, ORAL ARGUMENTS
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 25 (2008).
299. John G. Roberts Jr., Oral Advocacy and the Re-emergence of a Supreme Court
Bar, 30 J. S. CT. HIST. 68, 69 (2005).
300. Id. at 70.
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Justice Scalia, too, has observed that oral argument can make a
difference in the outcome of a case:
Does oral argument change a well-prepared judge’s mind?  Rarely.  What
often happens, though, is that the judge is undecided at the time of oral argu-
ment (the case is a close one), and oral argument makes the difference.  It
makes the difference because it provides information and perspective that the
briefs don’t contain.301
Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Kagan have also recognized the im-
portance of oral argument.302
1. Role of Experience
As a general rule, “attorneys with more prior litigating experience
before the Court present better oral arguments.”303  Other factors af-
fecting the quality of oral argument include whether the attorney at-
tended an elite law school, clerked on the Supreme Court, or is
considered a “Washington, D.C. insider.”304
Lazarus suggests that Supreme Court experts have an advantage
at oral argument because they are more comfortable at the lectern.305
EMA counsel Smith appeared quite comfortable at the lectern.  Cali-
fornia counsel Morazzini did not seem particularly nervous, but none-
theless may have found the experience somewhat intimidating.  After
the oral argument, Morazzini told his law school magazine:
You cannot believe how close you are to the justices . . . . When you are making
your argument, you are an arm’s length away from the chief justice.  If he
wanted to, he could reach out and slap you.  When the justices are talking,
you’re not hearing them through a speaker, you’re hearing their words from
their mouths . . . and they’re staring at you.306
301. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUAD-
ING JUDGES 139 (2008).
302. Justice Ginsburg has said, “I have seen few victories snatched at oral argument
from a total defeat the judges had anticipated on the basis of the briefs.  But I
have seen several potential winners become losers in whole or in part because of
the clarification elicited at oral argument.”  Wrightsman, supra note 298, at 40.
Justice Kennedy’s view is that oral “arguments can affect the outcome—not
often, but often enough . . . a lawyer can change minds by framing a case or issue
in ways the justices hadn’t considered.”  Janet Roberts et al., supra note 34, in
The Echo Chamber, supra note 29.  Justice Kagan believes that oral argument is
less important than the briefs, but it can make the difference between winning or
losing in some cases.  She uses oral arguments “both to find out things that I
really want to know and also to suggest some things to my colleagues.”  Harvar-
dLawSchool, Back at Harvard Law, Justice Kagan Reflects, YOUTUBE (Sept.24,
2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SLpKFac-OiE [https://perma.unl.edu/
5CYU-PJ8K] (view at approximately 19:35 and 22:55).
303. Timothy R. Johnson et al., The Influence of Oral Arguments on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99, 107 (2006).
304. Id. at 107–08.
305. Lazarus, supra note 27, at 1497.
306. Michael Heenan, Face-to-Face with the Supreme Court Justices, PACIFIC L., Sum-
mer 2011, at 7.
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Another reason Supreme Court specialists have an advantage is
that they are more likely to have done multiple moot courts before
other Supreme Court advocates at their firm, or elsewhere.307  Laza-
rus notes that these practice sessions can have a considerable impact
on the substance of the arguments presented.308  The EMA counsel
participated in at least two moot courts.  One was held at Georgetown
Law’s Supreme Court Institute.309  The other was before two former
Solicitors General, Paul D. Clement and Theodore B. Olsen, along
with Lee Levin, who has been called “the greatest First Amendment
attorney in the United States.”310  This moot court alone cost
$23,979.311
It is unclear whether California’s counsel participated in any moot
courts.312  But even if he did, he was unlikely to be able to practice his
argument and get feedback from Supreme Court experts as exper-
ienced and sophisticated as the ones available to Smith.
2. Quantitative Analysis
All Justices, except Justice Thomas, asked questions at the oral
argument.  A word count of the official transcript shows that Justice
Breyer spoke most often (1191 words) and Justice Kennedy spoke
least often (349 words).313  The Justices frequently interrupted coun-
sel to ask questions.  Morazzini was interrupted about forty times and
was allowed to finish his answer twenty-four times.  Smith was inter-
rupted about thirty times, and was allowed to finish twenty-nine an-
swers, or five more than Morazzini.314
Generally, the individual Justices addressed more words to counsel
for the side they ultimately voted against.  Justice Scalia, who voted in
favor of EMA, spoke 710 words when Morazzini was up, but only 231
words when EMA’s Smith took the lectern.315  Similarly, Justice
307. Lazarus, supra note 27, at 1519.
308. Id.
309. Respondents’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses, supra note 57.
310. Lee Levine, LEVINE SULLIVAN KOCH & SCHULZ, LLP, http://www.lskslaw.com/at
torneys/lee_levine.shtml [https://perma.unl.edu/RAM6-886B].  Sullivan had ar-
gued twice before the Supreme Court at the time of this publishing. Id.
311. This cost was included in EMA’s motion for attorneys’ fees and expenses totaling
$1,144,602.  Respondents’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses, supra note
57.
312. The NAAG’s Center for Supreme Court Advocacy provides opportunities for
states attorneys to do moot courts. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GEN-
ERAL, http://www.naag.org/naag/about_naag/center-supreme-court.php [https://
perma.unl.edu/HVL3-KMVD].
313. The word count totals are reported in the Appendix.
314. Using the official transcript, a counsel’s answer ending in a period was counted
as completed, while one ending with a dash was counted as interrupted.
315. The Justices joining Scalia’s opinion similarly directed more words to Morazzini
than Smith.
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Breyer, who voted in favor of California, spoke more words during
Smith’s argument (965) than during Morazzini’s argument (226).  The
two concurring Justices, however, did not follow this pattern.  Even
though they voted in favor of the EMA, they spoke more words to the
EMA counsel than to counsel for California.
The Justices spoke more words overall during Smith’s argument
(2824) than during Morazzini’s (2565).  Nonetheless, Smith managed
to get in 725 more words than Morazzini in his opening argument and
rebuttal combined.  The fact Smith spoke more words, was inter-
rupted less often, and answered more questions, may reflect his
greater experience arguing before the Supreme Court.
3. Qualitative Analysis
Whether an oral argument is well done, however, is not simply a
matter of counting words.  To some extent, the answer depends on the
“eyes of the beholder,” as well as the advocate’s goal.
Lyle Dennison, who frequently reports on oral arguments for
SCOTUSblog, described the oral argument as swinging “between deep
skepticism about state legislators’ ability to define ‘violence’ without
suppressing too much free expression, and an abiding feeling—a ‘com-
mon sense’ perception—that there is a social problem with children
committing digital murder or maiming on their computer screens.”316
He reported that Morazzini “found himself up against a wall of First
Amendment passion against the specific statute he was sent to
defend.”317
[Morazzini] came under withering questioning about the young people it in-
tended to protect.  Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., for example, asked: “What age
group are you talking about?  If a video manufacturer has to decide under
your statute where its game stands, what age of a child should the manufac-
turer have in mind?  A 17-year-old? A 10-year-old?”  Soon, Justice Ginsburg
chimed in: “California doesn’t make any distinctions between 17-year-olds and
4-year olds.”  Morazzini said it would be up to a jury to decide who the pro-
tected age group should be, but that response got him no traction.
. . . .
Morazzini’s lowest moment, though, appeared to come with a comment by
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, whose vote[ ] the state almost surely would
need to win the case.  The state had argued, Kennedy noted, that the constitu-
tional standards for obscenity could simply be applied to expressions of vio-
lence.  The problem, the Justice went on, is that “for generations there has
been a societal consensus about sexual material. . . . But you are asking us to
go into an entirely new area where there is no consensus, no judicial opinions.
And this indicates to me the statute might be vague, and I just thought you
would like to know that reaction.318
316. Lyle Dennison, Argument Recap: “Common Sense” and Violence, SCOTUSBLOG
(Nov. 2, 2010, 12:44 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/11/argument-recap-
common-sense-and-violence/ [https://perma.unl.edu/E6PD-3UZN].
317. Id.
318. Id.
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In contrast, the EMA counsel “clearly had a sympathetic Court
awaiting his argument.”319  Dennison describes Smith as “moving
along well with his argument, buttressed by helpful comments and
questions by Justice Scalia,” when he ran into questions about
whether there was anything that government could do to shield chil-
dren from extremely violent content.320  Dennison observed, “[i]f there
was one strategic error” by EMA counsel, it was his “contending under
questioning that there simply is no problem that legislatures need to
try to solve nor is there any way constitutionally that they could craft
a solution if they tried.”321  Dennison concluded this “was Smith’s low
point, but he made it without a hint of regret.  It was apparently basic
to his whole argument, but it appeared to have left an unsatisfied
Court.”322
After attending the oral argument, reviewing the transcript, and
listening to the recording, it is apparent that EMA’s counsel per-
formed better than California’s counsel.
a. Morazzini’s Oral Argument
California’s counsel struggled to give crisp and clear answers to
questions.  The following exchange, which occurred early in the argu-
ment, provides an example:
MR. MORAZZINI: So this morning, California asks this Court to adopt a rule
of law that permits States to restrict minors’ ability to purchase deviant, vio-
lent video games that the legislature has determined can be harmful to the
development and the upbringing—
JUSTICE SCALIA: What’s a deviant—a deviant, violent video game?  As op-
posed to what?  A normal violent video game?
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. Another blog noted that “[i]n response to pointed questioning, California’s
Deputy State Attorney General struggled to explain which video games would be
prohibited, why the law would be applied equally to 8 year olds and 17 year olds,
and generally how to define violence. . . . The gaming industry’s attorney fared
better in the argument, but was not immune from attack.”  Rob Van Arnam, The
Terminator v. The Video Gaming Industry: Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment
Merchants Association, WILLIAMS MULLEN (Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.williams
mullen.com/blog/terminator-v-video-gaming-industry-schwarzenegger-v-enter
tainment-merchants-association [https://perma.unl.edu/EDL7-6WGY].   Con-
sumer Electronics Daily reported that “both sides offered an upbeat take on what
transpired in the courtroom, saying their attorneys effectively made their cases.”
EMA President Bo Andersen thought that Smith’s oral argument “went very
well.”  Senator Yee also thought the argument went well for California, and that
“at the very least what this court is willing to do is to provide us with a pathway
as to how we can in fact have a law that would limit the sale of these ultra-violent
video games to children and withstand the test of a First Amendment challenge.”
Jeff Berman, Hard to Gauge How Supreme Court Will Rule on Violent Game Bat-
tle, CONSUMER ELECTRONICS DAILY (2010), 2010 WLNR 22176556.
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MR. MORAZZINI: Yes, Your Honor.  Deviant would be departing from estab-
lished norms.
JUSTICE SCALIA: There are established norms of violence?
MR. MORAZZINI: Well, I think if we look back—
JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, some of the Grimms’ fairy tales are quite grim, to
tell you the truth.
(Laughter.)
MR. MORAZZINI: Agreed, Your Honor.  But the level of violence—
JUSTICE SCALIA: Are they okay?  Are you going to ban them, too?
MR. MORAZZINI: Not at all, Your Honor.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: What’s the difference?   I mean, if you—if you are sup-
posing a category of violent materials dangerous to children, then how do you
cut it off at video games?  What about films?  What about comic books?
Grimms’ fairy tales?  Why are video games special?  Or does your principle
extend to all deviant, violent materials in whatever form?
MR. MORAZZINI: No, Your Honor.  That’s why I believe California incorpo-
rated the three prongs of the Miller standard.  So it’s not just deviant violence.
It’s not just patently offensive violence.  It’s violence that meets all three of
the terms set forth in—
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I think that misses Justice Ginsburg’s question,
which was: Why just video games?  Why not movies, for example, as well?323
At times, California counsel came across as not having a full grasp
of the record.  For example, when Justice Kagan asked if the State had
studies showing that video games were more harmful to minors than
movies, he replied:
MR. MORAZZINI: Well, in the record, Your Honor, I believe it’s the Gentile
and Gentile study regarding violent video games as exemplary teachers.  The
authors there note that video games are not only exemplary teachers of pro-
social activities, but also exemplary teachers of aggression, which was the fun-
damental concern of the California Legislature in enacting this statute.
So, while the science is continually developing—indeed, it appears that stud-
ies are being released every month regarding—324
Later, Justice Sotomayor asked about “the Anderson study [which]
says that the effect of violence is the same for a Bugs Bunny episode
as it is for a violent video.  So can the legislature now, because it has
323. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 166, at 4–5.
324. Id. at 6.
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that study, say we can outlaw Bugs Bunny?”325  Morazzini answered
no, but said nothing about the Anderson study.326
At another point, Justice Scalia asked whether there was any indi-
cation of an exception for violent speech when the First Amendment
was adopted.327  Morazzini began talking about “historic statutes” en-
acted by states.328  Before he got very far, Justice Sotomayor wanted
to know what was the “earliest statute and how much enforcement
was entered?”329
MR. MORAZZINI: Your Honor, I don’t know the earliest statute off the top of
my head.  I believe they go back into the early 1900s, perhaps later.  I apolo-
gize, but I don’t know that—330
An experienced Supreme Court advocate would have been better pre-
pared to answer these questions.
A Supreme Court expert would also know that failure to raise an
argument on appeal waives the argument.  Yet the following dialog
suggests Morazzini did not.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Justice Ginsburg talked about the labeling parts of
this Act.  The circuit court struck those portions of the Act.  You have not chal-
lenged that ruling.
MR. MORAZZINI: Justice—
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: There are two sections to the Act.
MR. MORAZZINI: Sure.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: One is a criminal act for selling to a minor, and the
other is a requirement that you label in a certain way each video.  The district
court said both were—I think the circuit court said both were unconstitu-
tional, correct?
MR. MORAZZINI: Yes, Justice Sotomayor.  They found—
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And your brief has not addressed the labeling re-
quirements at all.
MR. MORAZZINI: Well, we didn’t, Your Honor, because one holding of the
Ninth Circuit hinged upon the other.  In striking down the body of California’s
law, the restriction on the sale, the court found that since it’s not illegal to sell
these games to 18-year-olds, that the governmental purpose served behind the
label itself was—was in fact misleading.  So under the Zauderer case law—I
don’t have the case cite before me—but under Zauderer regarding lawyers’
advertising of—of services, it’s—the government can require a labeling, so
long as it’s necessary to prevent misleading the consumer.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 7.
327. Id. at 16–17.
328. Id. at 17.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 17.
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The Ninth Circuit found that because they struck down the body of our
law, that the “18” label would be misleading. So that—
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That’s an interesting concession on your part, that
the labeling doesn’t have a need separate from the restriction on sale.  I would
have thought that if you wanted a lesser restriction, that you would have pro-
moted labeling as a reasonable strict scrutiny restriction to permit the control
of sale of these materials to minors, but you seem to have given up that argu-
ment altogether.
MR. MORAZZINI: Justice Sotomayor, I certainly did not attempt or intend to
concede that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion was correct in any sense in this case.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, you have conceded it by not appealing it, but
okay.  We’re not—your case on labeling rises and falls on the sale to minors?
MR. MORAZZINI: At this point, I would agree, Your Honor.331
Consequently, Morazzini spent a long time discussing an issue that
was not actually part of the case.
Morazzini’s rebuttal was also weak.  Instead of reminding the
Court that if it accepted EMA’s argument, states would be unable to
limit minors’ access to even the most extreme and disturbing video
games, he used his four minutes to rebut minor points unlikely to af-
fect the outcome of the case.  For example, to counter Smith’s sugges-
tion that because video games cost $50–60, minors are unlikely buy
video games without parental involvement, he stated that the law
would also apply to rentals.332
b. Smith’s Oral Argument
In contrast, the EMA counsel clearly was familiar with the record
and usually had his answers ready, as the next example illustrates.
Justice Breyer asked why instead of making a new exception to the
First Amendment for violence, the Court could not simply apply tradi-
tional First Amendment standards.
MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I think if you apply strict scrutiny here, they do not
come close to the kind of showing that would be required under—under the
First Amendment.
First of all, they have not shown any problem, let alone a compelling problem,
requiring regulation here in a world where parents are fully empowered al-
ready to make these calls, where crime including violent crime, since the in-
troduction of these games, has been plummeting in this country, down 50
percent since the day Doom first went on the market 15 years ago; in a world
where parents are fully aware of what’s going on in their homes and aware of
the ratings system and can use all the other tools that we have talked about—
333
331. Id. at 20–21.
332. Id. at 56–57.
333. Id. at 44.
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This next exchange with Justice Alito illustrates Smith’s ability to
respond to a tough question and quickly get back to one of the central
arguments in EMA’s brief.
MR. SMITH: Your Honor, my main ground today is exactly that, that this
Court said last year in United States v. Stevens it doesn’t have a freewheeling
authority to create new exceptions to the First Amendment after 200 years
based on a cost-benefit analysis, and this is—this is a test of that.  This is
exactly what the State of California is asking you to do.
JUSTICE ALITO: But we have here a new—a new medium that cannot possi-
bly have been envisioned at the time when the First Amendment was ratified.
It is totally different from—it’s one thing to read a description of—as one of
these—one of these video games is promoted as saying, “What’s black and
white and red all over?  Perhaps the answer could include disposing of your
enemies in a meat grinder.”  Now, reading that is one thing.  Seeing it as
graphically portrayed [is another].
. . . .
So this presents a question that could not have been specifically contemplated
at the time when the First Amendment was adopted.  And to say, well, be-
cause nobody was—because descriptions in a book of violence were not consid-
ered a category of speech that was appropriate for limitation at the time when
the First Amendment was violated is entirely artificial.
MR. SMITH: We do have a new medium here, Your Honor, but we have a
history in this country of new mediums coming along and people vastly over-
reacting to them, thinking the sky is falling, our children are all going to be
turned into criminals.  It started with the crime novels of the late 19th cen-
tury, which produced this raft of legislation which was never enforced.  It
started with comic books and movies in the 1950s.  There were hearings
across the street in the 1950s where social scientists came in and intoned to
the Senate that half the juvenile delinquency in this country was being caused
by reading comic books, and there was enormous pressure on the industry.
They censored—they self-censored.  We have television.  We have rock lyrics.
We have the Internet.334
But Smith did take a long time to finally answer another question
from Justice Alito.
JUSTICE ALITO: Let me be clear about exactly what your argument is.  Your
argument is that there is nothing that a State can do to limit minors’ access to
the most violent, sadistic, graphic video game that can be developed.  That’s
your argument?
MR. SMITH: My position is—
JUSTICE ALITO: Is it or isn’t it?
MR. SMITH: My position is that strict scrutiny applies, and that given the
facts in the record, given the fact that the— the problem is already well con-
trolled, the parents are already empowered, and there are greatly less alter-
natives out there—
334. Id. at 37–38.
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. . . .
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So, just to be clear, your answer to Justice Alito
is, at this point, there is nothing the State can do?
MR. SMITH: Because there’s no problem it needs to solve that would justify—
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Could I—could I just have a simple answer?
MR. SMITH: The answer is yes, Your Honor.335
Smith surely knew the answer, but was probably trying to avoid ex-
plicitly acknowledging that deciding the case in favor of EMA would
prevent states from taking any action to limit young people’s access to
violent video games.
V. DID ADVOCACY MATTER?
As shown above, counsel for the video game industry was a Su-
preme Court expert who wrote a much stronger brief on the merits,
obtained far more amicus briefs in support, and fared better in oral
argument than did counsel for California.  Of course, it is impossible
to know whether the result would have been different if California had
been represented by a Supreme Court expert.  But there are reasons
to think it could have made a difference.
First, the odds favor petitioners in the Supreme Court.  Because
the Court has discretion over whether to hear a case, it is unlikely to
grant certiorari unless at least four Justices think the lower court de-
cided wrongly.  During the 2010 term, the Court took more cases from
the Ninth Circuit than any other Circuit, and it reversed in 73% of
those cases.336  Thus, the odds in favor of California prevailing in re-
versing the Ninth Circuit were significant.
Second, a common reason for taking a case is to resolve a split
among the Circuit Courts.337  Here, there was no circuit split to re-
solve.  Indeed, as EMA’s opposition pointed out, two other circuit
courts and six district courts had addressed whether violent video
games could be treated as obscenity for minors, and all concluded that
the obscenity-for-minors exception to the First Amendment did not en-
compass violent expression.338  Because the Court rarely grants re-
view of a lower court decision when it agrees with the outcome and
335. Id. at 48–49.
336. The reversal rate was slightly higher than the 70% reversal rate for all cases.
SCOTUSBLOG, END-OF-TERM STATISTICAL ANALYSIS—OCTOBER TERM 2010, at 1
(2011), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/SB_Summary_
Memo_OT10.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/F3T7-95G2] [hereinafter OT 2010
SUMMARY].
337. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS
189 (8th ed. 2008).
338. Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari, supra note 122, at 12.
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there is no circuit split, some thought that granting certiorari “sig-
naled [the Court’s] willingness to chart a new course . . . .”339
Third, the line-up of the Justices in Brown was most unusual.
Most non-unanimous decisions issued during the 2010 Term split
along ideological lines.  According to SCOTUSblog:
A sorted list of the Justices most frequently in the majority reveals a clear
division by ideology.  Justice Kennedy sits at the top of the list with 94% fre-
quency in the majority, and the conservative Justices—the Chief Justice and
Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Alito (in that order)—follow with 91%, 88%,
86%, and 86%.  The liberal Justices round out the list with Justices Kagan,
Sotomayor, Breyer, and Ginsburg joining the majority in 81%, 81%, 79[%],
and 74% of cases, respectively.340
Thus, it is unusual for three liberal Justices to join in an opinion writ-
ten by conservative Justice Scalia.341
Fourth, Justice Alito’s concurring opinion criticized the majority’s
approach in very strong language.  Indeed, one commentator observed
that “if not for their void for vagueness determination, Alito and Rob-
erts may just as easily have joined the dissent.”342  Justice Alito’s
opinion rejected the majority’s legal and factual analysis.  He dis-
agreed that Stevens controlled this case, and distinguished it on sev-
eral grounds.343  He accused the majority of distorting the effect of the
California law, which he viewed as reinforcing “parental decisionmak-
ing in exactly the same way as the New York statute upheld in Gins-
berg.  Under both laws, minors are prevented from purchasing certain
materials; and under both laws, parents are free to supply their chil-
dren with these items if that is their wish.”344
Justice Alito expressed the view that the Court should have pro-
ceeded with greater caution in “considering the application of un-
changing constitutional principles to new and rapidly evolving
technology . . . .”345  He thought the Court was “far too quick to dis-
miss the possibility that the experience of playing video games (and
the effects on minors of playing violent video games) may be very dif-
ferent from anything that we have seen before . . . ” and to “dismiss
339. Bob Egelko, Showdown Over Video Games, S.F. CHRON, Nov. 2, 2010, at C1.
340. OT 2010 SUMMARY, supra note 336, at 6.
341. The liberal Justices Ginsberg, Sotomayor, and Kagan agreed in full with Justice
Scalia in only 40%, 45%, and 49% of cases, respectively.  In contrast, the more
conservative Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito agreed in full with
Justice Scalia in 72%, 64%, 65%, and 60% of cases. SCOTUSBLOG, STAT PACK
FOR OCTOBER TERM 2010, at 19 (2011), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2011/06/SB_OT10_stat_pack_final.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/
NN2G-M4KX].
342. Richard H.C. Clay, Brown v. EMA: Too Good Bo be True for Video Games?,  Law
360 (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.law360.com/articles/261385/brown-v-ema-too-
good-to-be-true-for-video-games [https://perma.unl.edu/3VNZ-5KR6].
343. Brown, 564 U.S. at 813–15 (Alito, J., concurring).
344. Id. at 815.
345. Id. at 815, 806.
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the judgment of legislators, who may be in a better position than we
are to assess the implications of new technology.”346  He observed that
millions of players spend hours in the realistic alternative worlds cre-
ated by today’s advanced video games and that the amount of violence
in some of those worlds was “astounding.”347
Victims by the dozens are killed with every imaginable implement, including
machine guns, shotguns, clubs, hammers, axes, swords, and chainsaws.  Vic-
tims are dismembered, decapitated, disemboweled, set on fire, and chopped
into little pieces.  They cry out in agony and beg for mercy.  Blood gushes,
splatters, and pools.  Severed body parts and gobs of human remains are
graphically shown.  In some games, points are awarded based, not only on the
number of victims killed, but on the killing technique employed.348
In the future, Justice Alito predicted, video games will be even
more realistic; 3D video and sensory feedback will enable players to
experience physical sensations such as blood splattering from a blown-
off head.349  He concluded that if “the sophisticated games that are
likely to be available in the near future are combined with the charac-
teristics of the most violent games already marketed, the result will be
games that allow troubled teens to experience in an extraordinarily
personal and vivid way what it would be like to carry out unspeakable
acts of violence.”350
Justice Alito also rejected the majority’s view that playing a violent
video game was no different “from reading a description of violence in
a work of literature.”351  He contended that “[o]nly an extraordinarily
imaginative reader who reads a description of a killing in a literary
work will experience that event as vividly as he might if he played the
role of the killer in a video game.”352
Finally, Justice Kagan has said in subsequent interviews that she
was conflicted about Brown and might well have decided it differently.
In an interview at Harvard Law, she described Brown as a “really
346. Id.
347. Id. at 818.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 806.
350. Id. at 819.
351. Id. at 806.
352. Id.  He compared reading a passage in Crime and Punishment where the charac-
ter kills someone with an axe to “a video-game player who creates an avatar that
bears his own image; who sees a realistic image of the victim and the scene of the
killing in high definition and in three dimensions; who is forced to decide whether
or not to kill the victim and decides to do so; who then pretends to grasp an axe,
to raise it above the head of the victim, and then to bring it down; who hears the
thud of the axe hitting her head and her cry of pain; who sees her split skull and
feels the sensation of blood on his face and hands.”  He concludes that for “most
people, the two experiences will not be the same.” Id. at 820 (citation omitted).
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hard case, a super-hard case.”353  Later, at a forum at Princeton Uni-
versity, she described her decision-making process in Brown as “all
over the map. . . . Every day I woke up and I thought I would do a
different thing or I was in the wrong place.”354  She explained that she
personally thought the law was “OK,” but she did not think there was
sufficient evidence to satisfy strict scrutiny.355  Concerning her deci-
sion to join the majority in Brown she remarked: “That is the one case
where I kind of think I just don’t know.  I just don’t know if that’s
right.”356
The Supreme Court’s high reversal rate of Ninth Circuit decisions,
the lack of a circuit split, the unusual combinations of liberal and con-
servative Justices, the concurring Justices’ forceful rejection of the
majority’s reasoning, and Justice Kagan’s doubts about how to decide
this difficult case, all suggest that if California had done a better job of
framing and arguing its case, it could have come out differently.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Brown case lends credence to the concerns of Lazarus and
others that the increasing specialization of the Supreme Court bar ad-
vantages corporate interests.  If California, like the video game indus-
try, had been represented by a Supreme Court expert, it might have
crafted arguments that could have garnered five votes.  And even if
having expert representation on both sides did not change the ulti-
mate outcome, it could have resulted in a narrower decision—such as
that written by Justice Alito—which would have given states the
chance to try again to come up with a law that could be found
constitutional.357
Cases in which only the industry side can afford to hire expert Su-
preme Court counsel seem fundamentally unfair.  Most people would
not consider a tennis match between someone who just started playing
tennis and a tennis champion to be fair.  Similarly, it is unrealistic to
expect a Supreme Court newbie to do as well as a Supreme Court ex-
353. HarvardLawSchool, Associate Justice Elena Kagan Speaks with Dean Martha
Minow, YOUTUBE (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FWJkCD
JMGH4 [https://perma.unl.edu/56PZ-KFZC] (view at approximately 26:50).
354. Kyle Orland, Supreme Court Justice Second-Guesses Decisive Vote in Gaming
Free Speech Case, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 5, 2015, 4:10 PM), http://arstechnica.com/
gaming/2015/01/supreme-court-justice-second-guesses-decisive-vote-in-gaming-
free-speech-case/ [https://perma.unl.edu/E2XM-TPV5].
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Sometimes, the best result a Supreme Court specialist can hope to achieve is “a
soft landing.”  Lazarus, supra note 27, at 1541 (citation omitted).  An example of a
soft landing in Brown would be if the majority had struck down the statute solely
on vagueness grounds, leaving the questions about constitutionality and causa-
tion for a later case.
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pert.  And it is unfair to have Supreme Court rulings turn on the fact
that one party can afford to hire counsel with vastly more experience
than the other party.
The stakes in Supreme Court cases can be very high.  Here, the
Supreme Court’s decision has already had a significant impact: since
Brown, no governmental body has passed legislation to limit minors’
access to violent video games.  The practical effect has been to severely
limit the policy options available to address the significant problem of
gun violence in the U.S., an area where there are not a lot of realistic
policy options to begin with.  And horrifying acts of violence continue
unabated.
It is unknown whether a statute such as California’s would help to
reduce violence in the real world, and will remain unknown as long as
such laws are not allowed to take effect.  Because five Justices decided
this case broadly on First Amendment grounds, states have nothing
they can do to limit minors’ exposure to extremely violent video
games.  Whether one agrees or disagrees with this result, it is impor-
tant to have a fair process.
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APPENDIX
Word Count of Oral Argument in Brown
Word Count of Oral Argument in Brown
Word count of counsel 
Zackery P. Morazzini 
On behalf of Petitioners 
Paul M. Smith 
On behalf of  
Respondents
Total 2334 3059
Word count of Justices 
In response
to Morazzini
In response
to Smith Procedural Total words 
Justice Breyer  226 965  1191
Justice Scalia  710  231   941
Chief Justice Roberts   23  744 42  809
Justice Sotomayor  574  135   709
Justice Alito  130 394   524
Justice Kagan  350  142   492
Justice Ginsburg  287  129   416
Justice Kennedy  265   84   349
Total 2565 2824 42 5431
